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Federal Court Holds Uber’s “Sign-In-Wrap” Online Agreement Enforceable under Massachusetts Law

Posted on Sep 12th, 2016

By: Richard Gauthier

In a recent consumer class action case brought against Uber Technologies, the Massachusetts U.S. District Court held that the binding arbitration clause in Uber’s Terms and Conditions (“Terms”) was enforceable and prevented the consumers from seeking a class action in a court of law.  This decision is noteworthy because along with the ruling on arbitration clauses, it provides a thorough summary of the Massachusetts case law on the enforceability of online agreements.  It also highlights that Massachusetts law is favorable for the enforcement of such online agreements, perhaps more so than New York.

The plaintiffs in this case alleged that Uber overcharged them by imposing fictitious fees hidden in charges for legitimate local tolls. They sought class action relief for unfair and deceptive practices pursuant to Chapter 93A and common law claims for unjust enrichment. Uber moved to enforce the arbitration clause in the Terms pursuant to the FAA, and the Court agreed.

The Terms contained the following provision related to arbitration:

“[You] agree that any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation or validity thereof or the use of the Service or Application (collectively, “Disputes”) will be settled by binding arbitration, except that each party retains the right to bring an individual action in small claims court. . . . You acknowledge and agree that you and Company are each waiving the right to a trial by jury or to participate as a plaintiff or class User in any purported class action or representative proceeding. Further, unless both you and Company otherwise agree in writing, the arbitrator may not consolidate more than one person’s claims, and may not otherwise preside over any form of any class or representative proceeding.”

The Court began by analyzing whether the Terms were valid under general Massachusetts contract law principles.  A significant portion of this discussion relies on Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc.,  a 2013 Massachusetts court decision that we previously discussed here.  In this analysis, the Court provided a very helpful summary of Massachusetts law on the various types of online agreements:

  • Adhesion Contracts:  Massachusetts law applies the same general analysis as other jurisdictions with respect to the enforceability of online adhesion contracts.  Such agreements will be enforced provided they have been “reasonably communicated and accepted” and “it is reasonable to enforce the provision at issue.”

The Court then compared the different types of online agreements, which evolved from shrinkwrap software licenses that have come into use since the computer era:

  • A “Browsewrap” agreement is where the user “does not see the contract at all but in which the license terms provide that using a Web site constitutes agreement to a contract whether the user knows it or not”, or “[w]here the link to a website’s terms of use is buried at the bottom of the page or tucked away in obscure corners of the website where users are unlikely to see it.”
  • A “Clickwrap” agreement is an online contract “in which website users are required to click on an “I agree” box after being presented with a list of terms and conditions of use.
    • The Court commented that Clickwraps are more enforceable than Browsewraps because they “permit courts to infer that the user was at least on inquiry notice of the terms of the agreement, and has outwardly manifested consent by clicking a box.”
  • A “Sign-In-Wrap” Agreement (a term coined in a 2015 decision by Judge Weinstein of the EDNY) is somewhat of a hybrid between the Browsewrap and Clickwrap.  A “Sign-In-Wrap” Agreement does not have an “I accept” button and the user is not required to view the terms and conditions to use the related web service.  These agreements typically make terms and conditions available by link and provide that by registering for an account, or signing into an account, the user agrees to those terms and conditions.

In this case, the Court adopted the “Sign-In-Wrap” terminology and held that such agreements may be enforceable under Massachusetts law.  Here, the Court found that Uber’s Terms were a Sign-In-Wrap agreement.  The Court then summarized Massachusetts law on the enforceability of online agreements in general, as follows:

  • Online consumer agreements “will be enforced provided they have been reasonably communicated and accepted and if, considering all the circumstances, it is reasonable to enforce the provision at issue.”
  • The party seeking to enforce the contract has “the burden of establishing, on undisputed facts, that the provisions of the online agreement were reasonably communicated and accepted, which requires “[r]easonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers.” 

Reasonably Conspicuous Notice

  • The Court held that Massachusetts law does not require proof of actual notice of the terms of the Agreement.  All that is required is that the users have reasonable notice.  Uber’s language on the final screen of the account registration process (“By creating an Uber account, you agree to the Terms of Service & Privacy Policy”) was found sufficient. 
  • While the dispute resolution/arbitration clause did not appear until the user scrolled down to the 8th/9th page, the Court was satisfied that the user had reasonable notice because the heading for the clause was in bold and much larger than other non-heading text.
  • Notably, the Court refused to adopt the four-step process used by the EDNY Court that first coined the Sign-In-Wrap phrase, which would have required a factual analysis of the actual notice to the user.  The Court held that such an analysis would be impractical and make online agreements much more difficult to enforce, which this Court was unwilling to do.

Manifestation of Assent

  • The Court adopted a similar reasonable test for determining whether the user’s assent can be found.  Specifically, the Court held that the “Done” button on Uber’s website (as opposed to “I accept” or other similar buttons) was sufficient for finding that the user understood that by clicking this button it has consummated account registration and was bound by the Terms.

Having found that the Terms were enforceable, the Court quickly made its way to conclude that the binding arbitration clause and the waiver of class action remedies too were enforceable.  The Court noted that this standard favors arbitration and that the only exception would be where the arbitration itself would be an “illusory remedy.” Here, as Uber offered to pick up the arbitration costs for any claims up to $75,000, arbitration would not be illusory and that the clause should be binding.

 

 


Recent Delaware Chancery Court Decisions Opines on Arbitration Clause in Merger Agreement

Posted on Oct 1st, 2013

A recent letter opinion by the Delaware Chancery Court in a case between Shareholder Representative Services (SRS) and a buyer of a business processing business raises an interesting interpretation of an arbitration clause in a merger agreement. The case can be read here.  The dispute between the parties arose from indemnification claims brought by the buyer under the merger agreement, which SRS claimed did not comply with the requirements of the merger agreement.  While the merger agreement contained a mandatory arbitration provision, it also provided that the Arbitrator did not have authority to grant “injunctive relief, specific performance or other equitable relief”.  Relying on this provision, SRS brought various claims in the Chancery Court, including a claim for injunctive relief to stop buyer from a breach of the merger agreement by seeking indemnification to which it did not have a right.  The court disagreed with SRS and compelled arbitration.

The court first noted that since the arbitration clause did not explicitly commit the determination of substantive arbitrability to the arbitrator, the court had jurisdiction to decide on this specific issue.  In a footnote, the court noted that these issues are presumptively determined by a court.  (One drafting note from this determination is that parties that wish to avoid any court proceedings altogether may want expressly cover the issue of substantive arbitrability in their agreement.)

The court cited a 2002 Delaware Supreme Court decision for the steps to be taken by a Delaware court to assess an arbitration clause:

  • First, the court must determine whether the arbitration clause is broad or narrow in scope.
  • Second, the court must apply the relevant scope of the provision to the asserted legal claim to determine whether the claim falls within the scope of the contractual provisions that require arbitration. If the court is evaluating a narrow arbitration clause, it will ask if the cause of action pursued in court directly relates to a right in the contract. If the arbitration clause is broad in scope, the court will defer to arbitration on any issues that touch on contract rights or  contract performance.

The court cited a few examples of a “broad” arbitration clause:  “any dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or in connection with the …Agreement” and “any unresolved controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement” (the language at issue in the parties’ merger agreement). Finding this clause to be of the broad category, the court ruled that the determination of whether the indemnification claims were time-barred should be made by the arbitrator.

In support of its argument, SRS cited a 2006 decision involving an arbitration clause in a LLC operating agreement where the parties also sought injunctive relief from the court to compel a member to assent to a capital contribution.  The court distinguished this situation from the instance case, finding that SRS’s claims were really legal claims, not equitable ones, and colorfully noted that “[s]emantic legerdemain does not transform a legal claim into an equitable claim.”  The court reasoned that the relief that SRS has requested requires an analysis of the merits of the claims, which is legal (as opposed to equitable) in nature.   Accordingly, a plaintiff cannot “convert a claim for money damages arising from a breach of commercial contract . . . into a claim maintainable in equity by the expedient of asking that the defendant be enjoined from breaching such duty again.”

This decision is a useful reminder that boilerplate provisions such as arbitration clauses (and carveouts to those clauses) should be carefully considered in the context of any agreement, especially one relating to the sale of a business or other major transaction of a company.  While there may be varying opinions on the benefits of arbitration over litigation, once a path is chosen, the parties should carefully review these provisions to reduce ambiguity around any substantive and procedural issues that may arise.

If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email us.