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SJC issues key interpretive decision in employee-shareholder context

Posted on Mar 18th, 2014
Last week’s decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Selmark Associates et al. v. Ehrlich is a critical reminder to corporate lawyers and fiduciaries of the extensive protections of minority shareholders of Massachusetts corporations and the necessity for carefully drafted shareholder and employment agreements with shareholder employees in such companies.  Two key takeaways from this decision are as follows:
  • In closely held corporations, Massachusetts has long afforded minority shareholders the protection of a fiduciary duty owed to them by the other shareholders that is more extensive than other states, such as Delaware, for example.  While courts will allow shareholders to provide otherwise in written agreements, Selmark holds that if the shareholder agreements are not specifically on point, the fiduciary duty standard will apply.
  • Going the other way, Selmark holds that the solicitation of customers by a former employee shareholder (who is then still a shareholder) is also breach of such shareholder’s fiduciary duty to his fellow shareholders, even where the employment was terminated by the corporation and was considered a “freeze out” under corporate law.  While this holding certainly could give companies more leverage in separation discussions with former employee shareholders, the potential uncertainty created over the scope of such a non-solicitation duty that was not reduced to writing could present significant challenges to practitioners on both sides of the matter.

Because of the potential uncertainly to fiduciary duty claims added by this decision, parties on both sides would be well advised to address the issue of fiduciary duty head-on in their agreements, and to define as specifically as possible the scope of any limitations to that duty.  While this point is not addressed by the Court, both employers and employees may also consider the advantages (and disadvantages) of using holding companies and special purpose entities to separate the legal identity of the employee from that of the shareholder.

In addition, potential buyers and sellers of Massachusetts corporations should take note of this case in the planning of their transaction.

If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email us.

Background

They say that bad facts often make bad law.  If that is true, then this case certainly does not disappoint.  The case ultimately arises from a sudden (and apparently unwarranted) termination of employment of a shareholder employee, Ehrlich, who  had been a long term valued employee of Selmark and its affiliate Marathon.  Ehrlich originally was employed by Marathon and had informally been promised equity in the company by its founder.  As part of Marathon founder’s planned retirement and succession plan a number of years later, Erhlick entered into a series of agreements with the sole stockholder of Selmark (Elofson) involving the gradual sale of Marathon to Ehrlich and Selmark. These agreements comprised a stock purchase agreement, an employment agreement, a conversion agreement and a stock (shareholders) agreement.

The purchase agreement provided for the gradual acquisition of Marathon stock by the two purchasers through monthly payments pursuant to promissory notes. Upon full payment, Selmark would own 51% and Ehrlich 49%. Under the terms of the purchase agreement, Marathon bore primary responsibility for the monthly payments and Ehrlich and Selmark were each separate co-guarantors.

The employment agreement between Ehrlich and Marathon provided for a term of employment through 2002, with extension possible on the written agreement of the parties. Per its terms, Ehrlich became the vice-president of Marathon and potentially a director, and could only be terminated for cause. If the agreement was not extended, at the conclusion of the initial contract term, it would terminate and Ehrlich would be required to resign as an officer and director of Marathon.

Pursuant to a separate  conversion agreement, Ehrlich had the option, once he and Selmark fully paid off the purchase of Marathon, to convert what would his then 49% interest in Marathon into a 12.5% interest in Selmark (and then Selmark would own 100% of Marathon).  This agreement also required that, upon conversion, Selmark offer Ehrlich an employment agreement that would provide “for compensation, bonuses, expense payments, and benefits consistent with his percentage ownership of [Selmark].”  Independent of employment, upon conversion, Ehrlich was to become an officer of Selmark and member of its board of directors.

Under a separate “stock agreement”, if Ehrlich paid off his purchased stock and exercised his conversion option, Ehrlich’s rights as a minority stockholder of Selmark would be governed by that agreement.  This agreement provided both parties with the opportunity to end their business relationship through the sale of Ehrlich’s stock, which included a cross-purchase put and call rights for the parties.

After these agreements were executed, Marathon and Selmark remained separate entities, but presented themselves as “Selmark” to the outside world.  Ehrlich identified himself as a VP of Selmark even, while technically  he was an employee and vice-president of Marathon.  Ehrlich’s employment agreement expired by its terms in 2002, but Ehrlich remained an employee of Marathon and retained his position as vice-president. In 2003, Ehrlich began to report directly to Selmark’s management and received no complaints about his job performance.

In the summer of 2007, Ehrlich provided notice to Elofson that he intended to accelerate his final payments on his 49% share of Marathon stock by December 2007.  According to the Court, Elofson then decided that he did not want Erhlich as a business partner and in October 2007 informed Ehrlich that his employment with Marathon was terminated and offered for  Selmark to purchase Ehrlich’s 49% interest in Marathon for the same price he would have received had he converted his Marathon shares into Selmark stock and then Selmark had exercised its call rights pursuant to the stock agreement.  To assuage him to sell his shares, Elofson also told Ehrlich that Marathon did not have the cash-flow to support the continuing payments under the Notes, and that Ehrlich would have to meet the shortfall if he did not sell his shares to Elofson.

In November 2007, Ehrlich took a job with a competing manufacturer’s representative company and afterwards solicited some of Marathon’s customers. After his termination, Ehrlich received a small severance, but did not cash in his Marathon stock under the terms offered in the termination letter and remained a minority shareholder of Marathon.

Following his termination, Ehrlich did not believe that Marathon had insufficient funds to make its remaining payments under the notes.  Taking matters somewhat into his own hands, he suspended payments to Marathon which appears to have only complicated the parties disputed because of the default issues that arose.  While it appears that Ehrlich did eventually pay off his portion of the Notes and attempted to cure the default, the ambiguity over whether he perfected his conversion rights and his shareholder rights under the stock agreement added additional complexity to the dispute.

In 2008, Selmark and Marathon sued Ehrlich for breach of fiduciary duty for his solicitation of Marathon customers, and  Ehrlich responded with thirteen counterclaims against counterclaims, also including fiduciary duty claims.  At trial, the jury ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on their fiduciary duty claim, and in favor of Ehrlich (with respect to Selmark and Elofson) on his breach of contract, fiduciary duty and 93A counterclaims, netting a significant verdict in his favor.  (The trial judge also later doubled the 93A damages and awarded attorney’s fees. )  The parties then appealed.

Discussion

While many aspects of this decision are worth a careful reading in its original, unabridged version, the most interesting parts of this case for me relate to its holdings on the fiduciary duty issue.

1.  Fiduciary Duty owed to Ehrlich as an Employee Shareholder.  The jury found that Selmark and Elofson breached their fiduciary duties to Ehrlich in relation to the termination of his employment by Marathon.  Citing the long standing precedent in Massachusetts protecting minority stockholders in closely held corporations, the SJC held that a “freeze-out” can occur “when a minority shareholder is deprived of employment”.

Although the Court acknowledged that fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty may be inapplicable where the parties have negotiated a series of agreements intended to govern the terms of their relationship, the challenged conduct must be clearly contemplated by the terms of the written agreements.  The presence of a contract “will not always supplant a shareholder’s fiduciary duty, ” and when the contract does not entirely govern the other shareholders’ or directors’ challenged actions, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty may still lie.   To supplant the otherwise applicable fiduciary duties of parties in a close corporation, the terms of a contract must clearly and expressly indicate a departure from those obligations.

In this case, while the parties had entered into multiple, complex written agreements, the Court still held that none of these agreements covered the duties at issue.  The Court reasoned that none of the agreements contained terms that addressed Ehrlich’s employment rights upon expiration of his Marathon employment agreement and before conversion of his Marathon stock.  Finding that fiduciary duty did apply, the Court affirmed the trial court’s findings in favor of Ehrlich on these issues.  Among its reasoning, the Court noted that Elofson could have sought less harmful alternatives before resorting to termination, and cited precedent that a fellow shareholder employee is owed “real substance and communication, including efforts to resolve supposed complaints by less drastic measures than termination.”

2.  Fiduciary Duty owed by Ehrlich.   At trial, Marathon and Selmark argued that Ehrlich violated his fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty to Marathon when he solicited Marathon’s customers for his new employer. The jury agreed, and awarded them $240,000 in damages.  On appeal, Ehrlich contended that, because he was fired by Elofson and essentially “frozen out” of Marathon, he had the right to compete with Marathon without committing a breach of his fiduciary duties to the company.

Ruling in favor of the employer in this case, the Court cited long-standing precedent under Massachusetts law that  shareholders in close corporations owe fiduciary duties not only to one another, but to the corporation as well.  (See, e.g., Chambers v. Gold Medal Bakery, Inc., 464 Mass. 383, 394 (2013); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. at 593.)

At issue here was whether those fiduciary duties to the corporation continue once a shareholder has been “frozen out,” or wrongfully terminated, by that corporation.   Declining to follow precedent from the Supreme Court of Wyoming that held that a freeze out does extinguish such a duty, the Court held that the fiduciary duty does, in fact, survive a freeze out.  The Court saw what Ehrlich proposed as a “drastic step” and reasoned that “allowing a party who has suffered harm within a close corporation to seek retribution by disregarding its own duties has no basis in our laws and would undermine fundamental and long-standing fiduciary principles that are essential to corporate governance.”

Because the Court did not address what would be the scope and extent of such a duty, parties are still advised to address all such issues in a written non-solicitation agreement, which can define more precisely the specifics such as the term, geographic scope and other similar issues.

 

 

 

 

 


SEC Proposes New Rules under JOBS Act to Facilitate Investment in Private Companies

Posted on Jan 16th, 2014

Pursuant to the Title IV of the JOBS Act, in December 2013  the SEC proposed new rules to facilitate start ups and smaller companies to raise capital.  Title IV of the JOBS Act created a new exemption under section 3(b)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (Securities Act), for smaller offerings. As directed by section 3(b)(2), the proposed rules would amend  the existing Regulation A, an exemption for unregistered public offerings of securities up to $5 million.

These proposed rules could be significant. The amended Regulation A, commonly referred to as “Regulation A+,” is intended to facilitate capital formation for small companies by addressing certain issues in the current Regulation A that have deterred companies from using Regulation A to raise funds, including the low maximum offering amount and the high costs of state blue-sky compliance requirements.  The proposed rules would create two tiers of Regulation A offerings: Tier 1 for offerings of up to $5 million in a 12-month period and Tier 2 for offerings up to $50 million in a 12-month period.  Both tiers would be subject to certain basic eligibility, disclosure, and procedural requirements that are derived from the existing Reg A framework, with certain updates to conform to current practices for registered offerings. Tier 2 offerings would be subject to additional requirements, including the provision of audited financial statements, ongoing reporting obligations, and certain investment limitations.  Tier 2 offerings would provide federal law preemption and thus be exempt from having to comply with state blue-sky requirements.

The proposed rules are subject to a 60-day public comment period after publication in the Federal Register. If adopted, Regulation A+ has the potential to provide start-ups and private companies with a viable alternative for raising capital quickly and inexpensively, while improving the liquidity of their securities in secondary markets.  We will continue to monitor these developments and will post updates as they become available.

 


Due Diligence Counts

Posted on Oct 5th, 2013

Private equity and venture capital funds who distinguish themselves as being “active investors” should take note of a recent First Circuit decision in the Sun Capital Partners III et al v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund decision where the could The First Circuit found a private equity fund can be jointly and severally liable for the unfunded pension obligations of companies in its portfolio where it took an active role in the company’s business.

The portfolio company in question, Scott Brass, Inc., went into bankruptcy and defaulted on its withdrawal obligations to the New England Teamsters &Trucking Industry Pension Fund (Teamsters) at a time when the company was held by two Sun Capital Funds. The Teamsters argued that the funds were jointly and severally liable for the Scott Brass obligations because they were engaged in a trade or business and were controlled by ERISA along with Scott Brass.

The Massachusetts federal district court disagreed in late 2012 and held that the Sun Capital funds were not trades or businesses, and were instead private investment funds whose only function was to receive investment income. The First Circuit, in a decision that was admittedly “fact specific”, reversed, reasoning that what might otherwise be a passive investment could qualify an investor to be a trade or business when it is coupled with certain activities. The court referred to this as the “investment plus” analysis but declined to establish specific guidelines for what those “certain activities” might be.

Factors that the court did mention include:

  • The general partners of the Sun Capital funds had hiring and firing authority and otherwise managed the day-to-day operations of their portfolio companies.
  • Sun Capital affiliates actively worked on improving and restructuring the portfolio in order to sell it at a better price. These affiliates also served on the boards of portfolio companies and held the majority of the seats on the Scott Brass board.
  • Sun Capital Fund IV in particular received management fees from Scott Brass.

These factors prompted the Court to render its decision as to Sun Capital Fund IV and to remand the case as to Sun Capital Fund III for a new “trade or business” analysis; the receipt of management fees from Scott Brass is a key consideration.

Even if ERISA work isn’t your area, this case is an important reminder that even well-crafted reps and warranties and corporate limited liability shields may not protect an investor from being pursued by creditors of a portfolio company, especially a bankrupt one. For legal issues such as funded and unfunded retirement plans covered by ERISA, there is no substitute for careful due diligence by specialized professionals. Second, investors who find themselves in a similar situation should seek guidance from the Sun Capital case on how to manage the investment without toeing the line that results in potential exposure to the fund managers and their assets.

If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email us.


SEC Approves Crowdfunding Venture Capital Model

Posted on Apr 9th, 2013

On March 28th, FundersClub became the first online venture capital business to be approved by the SEC. The online investment platform received a no-action letter from the SEC essentially giving the company a thumbs up, legally speaking. This is significant across the board as players throughout the venture capital industry and companies searching for funds seek out creative fundraising sources to help bootstrap and fill a capital gap for smaller investments.

FundersClub resists the term “crowdsourcing,” but it does share some crowdsourcing traits. The platform allows investors who are accredited by the company to select companies for investment from a broad range of choices. The companies themselves are early-stage startups with business plans researched by FundersClub. In other words, the platform vets, curates and connects high quality investors and companies in need of funding, and does so while appearing as a single entity.

The issue of legality arose because FundersClub is not a registered broker-dealer. FundersClub simply responded that it was merely moving offline venture capital advising work into the online space. The SEC agreed with them, at least for now.

Also of significance here is the success of FundersClub despite the traditional need for relationships and networking in the venture capital arena. When it comes to doling out large sums of money, vetting matters. Investors have historically been reluctant or unwilling to make investments without personal interactions and referrals.

The victory of FundersClub highlights the ways that the VC landscape is shifting. Few investors today have the ability to maintain a truly diverse portfolio using personal connections. As outsourcing becomes more common investors feel more comfortable trusting vetting and other homework to specialists like FundersClub, and early-stage companies benefit from the exposure they get from the arrangement.

At this point FundersClub looks like it is here to stay. The National Venture Capital Association has accepted FundersClub this year as its first online member, and as of this writing FundersClub has helped its startups raise approximately $26 million. Whether other companies will jump onto the bandwagon and copy the FundersClub model remains to be seen, but we would expect this model to quickly grow and adapt as the market develops.

If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email us.


Some Thoughts on Convertible Notes vs. Straight Equity

Posted on Mar 15th, 2013

In today’s early stage fundraising market, most seed investments come in several flavors: common stock, convertible notes (or “converts” as they are sometimes called) and a simple preferred stock investment. There are a lot of interesting posts on this topic on Quora and elsewhere so we thought that we would provide our take.

Common Stock

If you are looking for a simple and inexpensive process and you are raising a small amount of money ($250,000 or less), common stock may be a good choice. The documentation can be very simple – a short subscription agreement (with an investor questionnaire), shareholder agreement, stock certificates and you may be done. Typical terms include basic information rights, rights of first refusal and co-sale (or tag along) rights and a pro-rata right to participate in the next round of financing of the Company. From the company’s standpoint, it is generally a good idea to keep these deals as simple as possible, both to keep costs down and to avoid a complicated structure that could impact future investment rounds. If the company is an S-corporation, a common stock round (assuming all investors are eligible S-corp shareholders) also helps the company to keep its S-corp status, which can create tax benefits for active investors and founder shareholders.

The downside of an early common stock round is that it can lock the company into a fixed valuation that has not been really tested by the market. If the valuation is set too high, it will be difficult for the company to issue cheap stock and options. Since this is often a key attraction in joining a company at an early stage before they raise a larger capital round, an excessively high valuation could prejudice the company in attracting key talent at this formative stage. Another downside to a fixed price is that follow-on investors may challenge the valuation that was reached and try to impose a lower valuation—a down round—later. This potentially puts the company in the awkward position of mediating between the original investors and the new money. The original investors, of course, put their money in at a higher risk and may insist on their negotiated deal. The new money may want to pay less and thereby substantially dilute the original seed investors. Unlike a preferred stock or convertible note structure, common stock usually does not offer a simple price protection (like a weighted average broad based anti-dilution adjustment).

If the common stock value is too low, it may be unfair to the founders and key employees. This issue may take awhile to germinate, but by the first or second venture round, there may be pressure from management and the new investors to try to “reshuffle the deck” to get the key players more of a stake in the Company’s long term outcome.

Convertible Notes

There a lot of variations on this deal structure. Over the last several years, the most prevalent terms include an unsecured note carrying a 24-36 month term, interest ranging from 5-10%, and a conversion price based on the next “Qualifying Financing” of the Company (usually $1-2MM of new money). The conversion price is now often subject to two outside conditions that help reduce some of the uncertainty of the valuation of the Qualified Financing by subjecting it to a cap and a discount of the price in that round. The cap can range from $1-2MM on low end (considered low) to $7-8MM on the higher end (this range is usually seen where the Company already has some traction or where the founders are known players and therefore able to command better terms). The discount ranges from zero to 30%, usually being in the realm of 10-20%. Similar to common stock terms, investors usually get basic information rights and pro-rata participation rights for the company’s next financing round.

The documentation for these deals also tends to be pretty light, and while a bit more than the common stock offering, a lot less than a preferred stock investment. Typical documents involve a subscription or purchase agreement and some form of convertible note. Deals can also include warrants, although this seems a bit less common in today’s market. Similar to a common stock round, these deals can be closed quickly and cost-efficiently.

Like the common stock deals, a downside of convertible notes for the company can arise at the time of the next round, if the new investors see the terms as being too rich and do not want the old investors converting into the same security as them, and at a lower price. This issue has caused many sophisticated investors to opt for more set terms on valuation, resulting in the recent popularity of preferred seed rounds, discussed below.

Series Seed or Series A-1 Lite Preferred Stock

Because preferred stock investments are significantly more complicated to close than the other deal formats, a number of national law firms and investor syndicates have tried to develop a simple set of deal documents to make this structure more attractive. (See Fenwick & West Series Seed Docs for example.) While we commend these authors for trying to establish an open-source library to streamline this process and reduce expenses, these documents are basically a watered down version of other more comprehensive VC form documents, such as the NVCA Model Documents, and leave a lot of details out that could be material. For a small amount of investment — $500,000 or less — it would seem hard to justify this structure. Also, if the Company is an S-corp, it will automatically blow the Company’s S-corp election, something that may be better delayed until the investment amount is substantial and merits losing the single-tax structure. The creators behind the Series Seed argue that those documents can be just as fast and cost-effective as convertible notes, with the added benefits of giving “investors more clear definition around rights, more stability and less potential squabbling in the next round.”

The bottom line is that no structure is perfect and there are tradeoffs for all of the parties involved. While there are lots of free (and freemium) resources available to help educate entrepreneurs on these issues, experienced counsel should be sought to help document any transaction and ensure that it is done properly. All of these structures are designed to be cost efficient, to reduce the inevitable temptation for clients to do it themselves, and to allow folks with little or no money to establish the right foundation for their investment that will facilitate their growth and future investment potential.

If you have any questions about this topic, please email us.