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Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Rules on Liability of Directors and Investors For Wages to Corporate Employees

Posted on Jan 10th, 2018

Ryan S. Carroll
January 10, 2018

A constant concern for board members and investors is the personal liability to which they might be exposed as a result of their typically limited roles with a company. Thanks to a recent ruling by Massachusetts’ highest court, board members and investors of companies can take some comfort that liability for wages pursuant to the Massachusetts Wage Act, M.G.L. c. 149, § 148 (Wage Act) will not apply in most cases.

In Andrew Segal vs. Genitrix, LLC, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that two former board members and investors in Genitrix, LLC (Genitrix) were not personally liable under the Wage Act for failing to pay wages owed to the former president of the Company, Andrew Segal (Segal). The Court concluded that, “…the Wage Act does not impose personal liability on board members, acting only in their capacity as board members, or investors engaged in ordinary investment activity.” It further concluded that, “… to impose such liability, the statute requires that the defendants be ‘officers or agents having the management’ of a company.” Additionally, defendants who were former board members had limited agency authority and management of the company as they were not also designated as company officers.

The scenario in the Genitrix case, while apparently being a case of first impression in terms of the law, is actually quite common in the startup world. Genitrix was a life-sciences startup that raised several rounds of angel financing, pursuant to which the investors had rights to sit on the Board and to approve various major corporate actions. As the Company’s cash position depleted and the business did not take off as planned, it was unable to raise additional funds. At that time, Segal, the Company’s founder, president and key employee, took it upon himself to defer his own compensation and implement other cost-cutting measures. Because the investors had approval rights over these matters, these matters were approved, or at least made known, to the Board. To keep the Company in business, the investors also put in additional emergency capital which included specific terms on how the funds would be applied, among other conditions. Segal later argued that these approval rights amounted to the directors and investors becoming “agents having management of [the] corporation,” which the Court rejected.

A brief summary of the Wage Act as the Court applied it to board members and investors in the Genitrix case is as follows:
1) employers are required to compensate employees for earned wages;
2) an employer may be sued directly if it does not pay employees for earned wages;
3) an “employer” is a business or person having employees in its, his or her service;
4) in corporations, “employers” are, by definition, the president, treasurer, and any officer or agents having the management of the corporation (in addition to the corporation itself)
5) the Wage Act does not include board members or investors as “employers” to the extent their roles are limited to those of what a board member or investor would typically do in order to safeguard their investments or participate in board meetings; and
6) if personal liability is to be imposed on individuals who are board directors or investors, it will not be imposed by virtue of their holding those roles, but they must be also be (i) the president, (ii) the treasurer, or (iii) officers or agents having assumed and accepted individual responsibility for the management of the company.

In concluding against a finding of agency, the Court reasoned that a Board acts collectively and not individually; accordingly, the actions of a director are not of an agent, but “as one of the group which supervises the activities of the corporation.” Similarly, an investor’s exercise of its rights is separate and distinct from serving as an agent. Exercising those rights and, in particular, the “leverage as an investor over infusions of new money” are separate and distinct from being an agent having the management of the company. While the documents in this case did provide the investors with some, albeit very limited, powers regarding Segal’s employment agreement (which included the Company’s rights under that agreement to fire Segal for cause and to select his successor), the Court held that this limited authority would not amount to “agency” as required for liability to apply under the Wage Act.

It is also important to note that Genitrix was a Delaware limited liability company headquartered in Boston, and not a Massachusetts limited liability company. While the Massachusetts corporate laws generally would not be applicable to corporate directors and officers for a Delaware entity – which would be governed by Delaware law under what is known as the “internal affairs doctrine” – the Wage Act applies to any employer in the Commonwealth regardless of where it is formally organized.

While this ruling is a win for board members and investors, it does not mean that they cannot be found liable pursuant to the Wage Act. This case illustrates how important it is for board members and investors to only become officers of a company if necessary and to limit their agency authority and exposure to management of the company in the language contained in their company documents.

We recommend having experienced corporate or employment counsel analyze each situation to ensure that board members and investors are not agreeing to written documents overstating their level of management or agency authority, and that investors and board members consult with such counsel to understand the limitations of their roles that are necessary to avoid the risk of personal liability.


Federal Court Holds Uber’s “Sign-In-Wrap” Online Agreement Enforceable under Massachusetts Law

Posted on Sep 12th, 2016

By: Richard Gauthier

In a recent consumer class action case brought against Uber Technologies, the Massachusetts U.S. District Court held that the binding arbitration clause in Uber’s Terms and Conditions (“Terms”) was enforceable and prevented the consumers from seeking a class action in a court of law.  This decision is noteworthy because along with the ruling on arbitration clauses, it provides a thorough summary of the Massachusetts case law on the enforceability of online agreements.  It also highlights that Massachusetts law is favorable for the enforcement of such online agreements, perhaps more so than New York.

The plaintiffs in this case alleged that Uber overcharged them by imposing fictitious fees hidden in charges for legitimate local tolls. They sought class action relief for unfair and deceptive practices pursuant to Chapter 93A and common law claims for unjust enrichment. Uber moved to enforce the arbitration clause in the Terms pursuant to the FAA, and the Court agreed.

The Terms contained the following provision related to arbitration:

“[You] agree that any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation or validity thereof or the use of the Service or Application (collectively, “Disputes”) will be settled by binding arbitration, except that each party retains the right to bring an individual action in small claims court. . . . You acknowledge and agree that you and Company are each waiving the right to a trial by jury or to participate as a plaintiff or class User in any purported class action or representative proceeding. Further, unless both you and Company otherwise agree in writing, the arbitrator may not consolidate more than one person’s claims, and may not otherwise preside over any form of any class or representative proceeding.”

The Court began by analyzing whether the Terms were valid under general Massachusetts contract law principles.  A significant portion of this discussion relies on Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc.,  a 2013 Massachusetts court decision that we previously discussed here.  In this analysis, the Court provided a very helpful summary of Massachusetts law on the various types of online agreements:

  • Adhesion Contracts:  Massachusetts law applies the same general analysis as other jurisdictions with respect to the enforceability of online adhesion contracts.  Such agreements will be enforced provided they have been “reasonably communicated and accepted” and “it is reasonable to enforce the provision at issue.”

The Court then compared the different types of online agreements, which evolved from shrinkwrap software licenses that have come into use since the computer era:

  • A “Browsewrap” agreement is where the user “does not see the contract at all but in which the license terms provide that using a Web site constitutes agreement to a contract whether the user knows it or not”, or “[w]here the link to a website’s terms of use is buried at the bottom of the page or tucked away in obscure corners of the website where users are unlikely to see it.”
  • A “Clickwrap” agreement is an online contract “in which website users are required to click on an “I agree” box after being presented with a list of terms and conditions of use.
    • The Court commented that Clickwraps are more enforceable than Browsewraps because they “permit courts to infer that the user was at least on inquiry notice of the terms of the agreement, and has outwardly manifested consent by clicking a box.”
  • A “Sign-In-Wrap” Agreement (a term coined in a 2015 decision by Judge Weinstein of the EDNY) is somewhat of a hybrid between the Browsewrap and Clickwrap.  A “Sign-In-Wrap” Agreement does not have an “I accept” button and the user is not required to view the terms and conditions to use the related web service.  These agreements typically make terms and conditions available by link and provide that by registering for an account, or signing into an account, the user agrees to those terms and conditions.

In this case, the Court adopted the “Sign-In-Wrap” terminology and held that such agreements may be enforceable under Massachusetts law.  Here, the Court found that Uber’s Terms were a Sign-In-Wrap agreement.  The Court then summarized Massachusetts law on the enforceability of online agreements in general, as follows:

  • Online consumer agreements “will be enforced provided they have been reasonably communicated and accepted and if, considering all the circumstances, it is reasonable to enforce the provision at issue.”
  • The party seeking to enforce the contract has “the burden of establishing, on undisputed facts, that the provisions of the online agreement were reasonably communicated and accepted, which requires “[r]easonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers.” 

Reasonably Conspicuous Notice

  • The Court held that Massachusetts law does not require proof of actual notice of the terms of the Agreement.  All that is required is that the users have reasonable notice.  Uber’s language on the final screen of the account registration process (“By creating an Uber account, you agree to the Terms of Service & Privacy Policy”) was found sufficient. 
  • While the dispute resolution/arbitration clause did not appear until the user scrolled down to the 8th/9th page, the Court was satisfied that the user had reasonable notice because the heading for the clause was in bold and much larger than other non-heading text.
  • Notably, the Court refused to adopt the four-step process used by the EDNY Court that first coined the Sign-In-Wrap phrase, which would have required a factual analysis of the actual notice to the user.  The Court held that such an analysis would be impractical and make online agreements much more difficult to enforce, which this Court was unwilling to do.

Manifestation of Assent

  • The Court adopted a similar reasonable test for determining whether the user’s assent can be found.  Specifically, the Court held that the “Done” button on Uber’s website (as opposed to “I accept” or other similar buttons) was sufficient for finding that the user understood that by clicking this button it has consummated account registration and was bound by the Terms.

Having found that the Terms were enforceable, the Court quickly made its way to conclude that the binding arbitration clause and the waiver of class action remedies too were enforceable.  The Court noted that this standard favors arbitration and that the only exception would be where the arbitration itself would be an “illusory remedy.” Here, as Uber offered to pick up the arbitration costs for any claims up to $75,000, arbitration would not be illusory and that the clause should be binding.

 

 


Regulation Crowdfunding – SEC assists smaller, non-public U.S. companies with raising capital

Posted on Nov 12th, 2015

Ryan S. Carroll

On October 30, 2015, the SEC voted to adopt Regulation Crowdfunding, the final rules allowing private companies to raise capital through crowdfunding and providing additional protection to investors in crowdfunding investments.  This post provides some background on crowdfunding, a summary of Regulation Crowdfunding’s rules and forms and how we can assist in helping you in your next crowdfunding financing.  While we are lawyers, this blog is not intended to be legal advice and should not be relied on as such.  If you would like legal advice on any of the information contained in this post, please contact us.

Background on “Crowdfunding”

Crowdfunding is a new and evolving financing method that can be used to raise relatively small amounts of capital from a large number of investors at a low cost using the Internet as a means to market the offering.  Regulation Crowdfunding are the new rules which will be applicable to crowdfunding offerings relying on Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”).  This Section was added by Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (“JOBS Act”) which allows private companies to raise capital through new “crowdfunding” exemptions.  We last wrote on the topic of crowdfunding in this post.

Many provisions of the JOBS Act require rulemaking by the SEC.  Regulation Crowdfunding and its forms will be effective 180 days after they are published in the Federal Register (tentatively, May 2016). This will complete the SEC’s major rulemaking requirement as mandated under the JOBS Act.

The final rules can be found here.

Summary of the Rules:

The recommended rules would, among other things:

1)      Permit issuers to offer the sale of and for investors to purchase securities in crowdfunding offerings, subject to limitations.

  • Such limitations on crowdfunding include:
    • the maximum aggregate amount of financing an issuer can raise through crowdfunding in a 12-month period is $1 million;
    • across all crowdfunding offerings, an individual investor, over a 12-month period may only invest, in the aggregate:\
      • the greater of $2,000 or 5% of the lesser of their annual income or net worth (if their annual income or net worth is less than $100,000); or
      • 10% of the lesser of their annual income or net worth, not to exceed $100,000 in value (if both the investor’s annual income and net worth are equal to or more than $100,000); and
    • an issuer will only be able to make an offering through a registered broker-dealer or through a funding portal and can only use one intermediary for an offering made pursuant to the exemption.

2)      Require issuers raising capital through crowdfunding to disclose certain information regarding their business and the securities being offered through Form C and other requirements.

  • The initial disclosure an issuer must file about the offering is a Form C, which must be provided to the SEC, investors and the intermediary facilitating the offering.
  • Information that must be disclosed on a Form C includes:
    • the price of the securities offered to the public or the method for determining the price, the target offering amount, the deadline to reach the target offering amount and whether the issuer will accept investments in excess of the target offering amount;
    • a discussion of the issuer’s financial condition, a description of the business and how the issuer plans on using the proceeds from the offering, information about the officers and directors of the issuer, information about owners of 20% or more of the issuer and certain related-party transactions; and
    • financial statements of the issuer that are accompanied by information from the issuer’s tax returns, reviewed by an independent public accountant, or audited by an independent auditor.

3)      Create a regulatory framework for intermediaries facilitating the crowdfunding transaction.

  • An issuer must use a registered broker dealer or a funding portal.
  • A funding portal is required to register with the SEC on new Form Funding Portal and become a member of a national securities association (currently, FINRA).
  • Regulation Crowdfunding requires the registered funding portals to:
    • provide investors with educational materials that explain the process for investing on the platform, the types of securities being offered and information an issuer must provide to investors, resale restrictions and investment limits;
    • take certain measures to reduce risk of fraud by having reasonable basis for believing issuers on the platform comply with the Regulation Crowdfunding and that such issuers have a way of keeping accurate records of security holders;
    • make information that an issuer is required to disclose available to the public on its platform for a minimum of 21 days before any security may be sold and throughout the entire offering of such security; and
    • provide channels of communication for discussions about the offerings on the platform, provide disclosure to investors about compensation to the intermediary, only accept an investment commitment after such investor has opened an account, has a reasonable basis for believing an investor complies with investment limitations, provide investors notices once they made investment commitments and confirmations at or before completion of the transaction, comply with maintenance and transmission of funds requirements and comply with completion, cancellation and reconfirmation of offerings requirements.
  • Regulations prohibit intermediaries to engage in certain activities, such as:
    • providing access to their platforms to issuers that they have reasonable basis for believing there is a potential for fraud or other investor protection concerns;
    • having a financial interest in an issuer where it is offering or selling securities on its platform, unless the intermediary is receiving such interest in the issuer as compensation for its services, subject to certain conditions;
    • compensating any person for providing the intermediary with personally identifiable information of any investor; and
    • offering investment advice or making recommendations, soliciting purchase, sales or offers to buy securities, compensating promoters and other solicitors, and holding possessing or handling investor funds or securities.

4)      Require issuers raising capital through crowdfunding to be subjected to ongoing reporting requirements, such as annual reports, to be filed with the SEC and provide such annual reports to investors through the intermediary.

  • If an issuer is raising $100,000 or less, the following are required to be reported (among other things):
    • amount of total income, taxable income, total tax as reported on federal tax forms (if any) and financial statements of the issuer certified by the principal executive officer of the issuer.
  • If an issuer is raising more than $100,000 and less than $500,000, the following are required to be reported (among other things):
    • financial statements of the issuer reviewed by an independent public accountant.
  • If an issuer is raising more than $500,000, the following are required to be reported (among other things):
    • financial statements of the issuer audited by an independent public accountant.

This post is only a summary of selected sections of Regulation Crowdfunding.  Crowdfunding is a very new and nuanced form of raising capital and we recommend you contact your attorney before pursuing any such transaction.  If you have any questions concerning the information in this post, please do not hesitate to contact me at ryan.carroll@hermanlawllc.com.  


Recent Massachusetts case finds defendant liable on a verbal personal guaranty, notwithstanding Statute of Frauds

Posted on Aug 13th, 2015

By: Richard Gauthier

In Chivian vs. Lepler, the Massachusetts Appellate Court recently held that an unsigned personal guaranty is valid, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds writing requirements.  This case is a somewhat surprising result and a reminder that great care should be made with verbal promises or assurances of personal guarantees or liabilities.

In 2003 the defendant, who was married to the plaintiffs’ daughter, approached the plaintiffs about a real estate investment. The parties agreed to invest $150,000 in the opportunity. Initially, the plaintiffs were equity investors, but after their initial investment turned a profit, the parties agreed that the equity would be converted into loans payable with interest. Both plaintiffs repeatedly asked the defendant to execute written personal guaranties; the defendant apparently agreed to do so, but never actually did. As of 2010, they had not received repayment and filed this action. At trial, the defendant admitted that he had promised to provide personal guaranties of the loans, but never signed them. He then asserted that the Statute of Frauds barred recovery on the personal guaranties absent a writing.

On appeal, the defendant claimed that because the Statute of Frauds bars recovery in contract on a personal guaranty absent a sufficient writing, it was error for the trial judge to send the case to the jury on a theory of promissory estoppel.  The Court held that it was “unpersuaded by the defendant’s contention that a partial writing is necessary to overcome the Statute of Frauds defense in the context of promissory estoppel.”  Because promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, the Court reasoned that it would be “harsh injustice to permit the Statute of Frauds to bar recovery for the plaintiffs where the defendant admits he induced the plaintiffs’ reliance by promising to execute a written agreement, the absence of which he now seeks to use to avoid the debt.”


Delaware extends statute of limitations to 20 years for breach of contract claims

Posted on Sep 6th, 2014

The State of Delaware recently passed legislation that authorizes a statute of limitations of up to 20 years for breach of contract claims.  Delaware is the first state to adopt a statute of limitations of such length for breach of contract claims.  The legislation, which amended Section 8106 of Title 10 of the Delaware Code, was effective on August 1, 2014.  The new amended Section enables parties to a written contract involving at least $100,000 to provide that up to a twenty year limitations period will apply to any breach claims arising from the contract.

Historically, the Delaware statute of limitations for contract type claims was either three years (for general contracts) or four years (for UCC claims).  Because claims for other types of liabilities (such as say ERISA or tax claims) a buyer could be find itself liable for these third party liabilities without a remedy against a seller if the shorter limitations period had already expired.  For this reason, practitioners have tried to draft around this issue by allowing claims from certain types of reps (often referred to as the “Fundamental Representations”) to survive by contract for a longer period of time.  However, the case law on whether this actually would be enforceable has been unclear and the issue often turns on whether a contract was signed “under seal”.   While a physical seal is not necessary in Delaware, it is important to reference those key words (signed under seal, executed under seal, etc.) next to the executory signature.  Clearly a somewhat an antiquated process, and a trap for the unwary waiting to happen.

The Delaware legislature has now responded by allowing the parties to contract for this extended limitations period, without the need for the arcane “seal” language.  Now that this period is up to 20 years, the parties’ bargained-for terms will be given much greater effect under typical asset purchase or merger agreements involving the acquisition of a private company.  Since many commercial contracts also are governed by Delaware law, even where the parties are not based in Delaware, it is important to note this change for that context as well.

Although the legislation does not specifically indicate whether it would apply to contracts entered into prior to August 1, case law discussing amendments to statutes of limitations as “remedial” and not affecting “substantive or vested rights,” particularly where a statute of limitations is not shortened so as to cut off a plaintiff’s right to bring suit, suggests that this legislation should apply to contracts entered into prior to its effective date.

 


SJC issues key interpretive decision in employee-shareholder context

Posted on Mar 18th, 2014
Last week’s decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Selmark Associates et al. v. Ehrlich is a critical reminder to corporate lawyers and fiduciaries of the extensive protections of minority shareholders of Massachusetts corporations and the necessity for carefully drafted shareholder and employment agreements with shareholder employees in such companies.  Two key takeaways from this decision are as follows:
  • In closely held corporations, Massachusetts has long afforded minority shareholders the protection of a fiduciary duty owed to them by the other shareholders that is more extensive than other states, such as Delaware, for example.  While courts will allow shareholders to provide otherwise in written agreements, Selmark holds that if the shareholder agreements are not specifically on point, the fiduciary duty standard will apply.
  • Going the other way, Selmark holds that the solicitation of customers by a former employee shareholder (who is then still a shareholder) is also breach of such shareholder’s fiduciary duty to his fellow shareholders, even where the employment was terminated by the corporation and was considered a “freeze out” under corporate law.  While this holding certainly could give companies more leverage in separation discussions with former employee shareholders, the potential uncertainty created over the scope of such a non-solicitation duty that was not reduced to writing could present significant challenges to practitioners on both sides of the matter.

Because of the potential uncertainly to fiduciary duty claims added by this decision, parties on both sides would be well advised to address the issue of fiduciary duty head-on in their agreements, and to define as specifically as possible the scope of any limitations to that duty.  While this point is not addressed by the Court, both employers and employees may also consider the advantages (and disadvantages) of using holding companies and special purpose entities to separate the legal identity of the employee from that of the shareholder.

In addition, potential buyers and sellers of Massachusetts corporations should take note of this case in the planning of their transaction.

If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email us.

Background

They say that bad facts often make bad law.  If that is true, then this case certainly does not disappoint.  The case ultimately arises from a sudden (and apparently unwarranted) termination of employment of a shareholder employee, Ehrlich, who  had been a long term valued employee of Selmark and its affiliate Marathon.  Ehrlich originally was employed by Marathon and had informally been promised equity in the company by its founder.  As part of Marathon founder’s planned retirement and succession plan a number of years later, Erhlick entered into a series of agreements with the sole stockholder of Selmark (Elofson) involving the gradual sale of Marathon to Ehrlich and Selmark. These agreements comprised a stock purchase agreement, an employment agreement, a conversion agreement and a stock (shareholders) agreement.

The purchase agreement provided for the gradual acquisition of Marathon stock by the two purchasers through monthly payments pursuant to promissory notes. Upon full payment, Selmark would own 51% and Ehrlich 49%. Under the terms of the purchase agreement, Marathon bore primary responsibility for the monthly payments and Ehrlich and Selmark were each separate co-guarantors.

The employment agreement between Ehrlich and Marathon provided for a term of employment through 2002, with extension possible on the written agreement of the parties. Per its terms, Ehrlich became the vice-president of Marathon and potentially a director, and could only be terminated for cause. If the agreement was not extended, at the conclusion of the initial contract term, it would terminate and Ehrlich would be required to resign as an officer and director of Marathon.

Pursuant to a separate  conversion agreement, Ehrlich had the option, once he and Selmark fully paid off the purchase of Marathon, to convert what would his then 49% interest in Marathon into a 12.5% interest in Selmark (and then Selmark would own 100% of Marathon).  This agreement also required that, upon conversion, Selmark offer Ehrlich an employment agreement that would provide “for compensation, bonuses, expense payments, and benefits consistent with his percentage ownership of [Selmark].”  Independent of employment, upon conversion, Ehrlich was to become an officer of Selmark and member of its board of directors.

Under a separate “stock agreement”, if Ehrlich paid off his purchased stock and exercised his conversion option, Ehrlich’s rights as a minority stockholder of Selmark would be governed by that agreement.  This agreement provided both parties with the opportunity to end their business relationship through the sale of Ehrlich’s stock, which included a cross-purchase put and call rights for the parties.

After these agreements were executed, Marathon and Selmark remained separate entities, but presented themselves as “Selmark” to the outside world.  Ehrlich identified himself as a VP of Selmark even, while technically  he was an employee and vice-president of Marathon.  Ehrlich’s employment agreement expired by its terms in 2002, but Ehrlich remained an employee of Marathon and retained his position as vice-president. In 2003, Ehrlich began to report directly to Selmark’s management and received no complaints about his job performance.

In the summer of 2007, Ehrlich provided notice to Elofson that he intended to accelerate his final payments on his 49% share of Marathon stock by December 2007.  According to the Court, Elofson then decided that he did not want Erhlich as a business partner and in October 2007 informed Ehrlich that his employment with Marathon was terminated and offered for  Selmark to purchase Ehrlich’s 49% interest in Marathon for the same price he would have received had he converted his Marathon shares into Selmark stock and then Selmark had exercised its call rights pursuant to the stock agreement.  To assuage him to sell his shares, Elofson also told Ehrlich that Marathon did not have the cash-flow to support the continuing payments under the Notes, and that Ehrlich would have to meet the shortfall if he did not sell his shares to Elofson.

In November 2007, Ehrlich took a job with a competing manufacturer’s representative company and afterwards solicited some of Marathon’s customers. After his termination, Ehrlich received a small severance, but did not cash in his Marathon stock under the terms offered in the termination letter and remained a minority shareholder of Marathon.

Following his termination, Ehrlich did not believe that Marathon had insufficient funds to make its remaining payments under the notes.  Taking matters somewhat into his own hands, he suspended payments to Marathon which appears to have only complicated the parties disputed because of the default issues that arose.  While it appears that Ehrlich did eventually pay off his portion of the Notes and attempted to cure the default, the ambiguity over whether he perfected his conversion rights and his shareholder rights under the stock agreement added additional complexity to the dispute.

In 2008, Selmark and Marathon sued Ehrlich for breach of fiduciary duty for his solicitation of Marathon customers, and  Ehrlich responded with thirteen counterclaims against counterclaims, also including fiduciary duty claims.  At trial, the jury ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on their fiduciary duty claim, and in favor of Ehrlich (with respect to Selmark and Elofson) on his breach of contract, fiduciary duty and 93A counterclaims, netting a significant verdict in his favor.  (The trial judge also later doubled the 93A damages and awarded attorney’s fees. )  The parties then appealed.

Discussion

While many aspects of this decision are worth a careful reading in its original, unabridged version, the most interesting parts of this case for me relate to its holdings on the fiduciary duty issue.

1.  Fiduciary Duty owed to Ehrlich as an Employee Shareholder.  The jury found that Selmark and Elofson breached their fiduciary duties to Ehrlich in relation to the termination of his employment by Marathon.  Citing the long standing precedent in Massachusetts protecting minority stockholders in closely held corporations, the SJC held that a “freeze-out” can occur “when a minority shareholder is deprived of employment”.

Although the Court acknowledged that fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty may be inapplicable where the parties have negotiated a series of agreements intended to govern the terms of their relationship, the challenged conduct must be clearly contemplated by the terms of the written agreements.  The presence of a contract “will not always supplant a shareholder’s fiduciary duty, ” and when the contract does not entirely govern the other shareholders’ or directors’ challenged actions, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty may still lie.   To supplant the otherwise applicable fiduciary duties of parties in a close corporation, the terms of a contract must clearly and expressly indicate a departure from those obligations.

In this case, while the parties had entered into multiple, complex written agreements, the Court still held that none of these agreements covered the duties at issue.  The Court reasoned that none of the agreements contained terms that addressed Ehrlich’s employment rights upon expiration of his Marathon employment agreement and before conversion of his Marathon stock.  Finding that fiduciary duty did apply, the Court affirmed the trial court’s findings in favor of Ehrlich on these issues.  Among its reasoning, the Court noted that Elofson could have sought less harmful alternatives before resorting to termination, and cited precedent that a fellow shareholder employee is owed “real substance and communication, including efforts to resolve supposed complaints by less drastic measures than termination.”

2.  Fiduciary Duty owed by Ehrlich.   At trial, Marathon and Selmark argued that Ehrlich violated his fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty to Marathon when he solicited Marathon’s customers for his new employer. The jury agreed, and awarded them $240,000 in damages.  On appeal, Ehrlich contended that, because he was fired by Elofson and essentially “frozen out” of Marathon, he had the right to compete with Marathon without committing a breach of his fiduciary duties to the company.

Ruling in favor of the employer in this case, the Court cited long-standing precedent under Massachusetts law that  shareholders in close corporations owe fiduciary duties not only to one another, but to the corporation as well.  (See, e.g., Chambers v. Gold Medal Bakery, Inc., 464 Mass. 383, 394 (2013); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. at 593.)

At issue here was whether those fiduciary duties to the corporation continue once a shareholder has been “frozen out,” or wrongfully terminated, by that corporation.   Declining to follow precedent from the Supreme Court of Wyoming that held that a freeze out does extinguish such a duty, the Court held that the fiduciary duty does, in fact, survive a freeze out.  The Court saw what Ehrlich proposed as a “drastic step” and reasoned that “allowing a party who has suffered harm within a close corporation to seek retribution by disregarding its own duties has no basis in our laws and would undermine fundamental and long-standing fiduciary principles that are essential to corporate governance.”

Because the Court did not address what would be the scope and extent of such a duty, parties are still advised to address all such issues in a written non-solicitation agreement, which can define more precisely the specifics such as the term, geographic scope and other similar issues.

 

 

 

 

 


Recent Delaware Supreme Court Decision Affirms Enforceability of Duty to Negotiate in Good Faith

Posted on Nov 13th, 2013

A recent Delaware Supreme Court decision in SIGA Technologies v. PharmAthene reaffirmed established Delaware law that an express promise to negotiate an agreement in good faith may be enforceable.   The Court also held that expectation damages may be awarded under Delaware law if a trial court can conclude that the parties would have reached an agreement but for a defendant’s bad faith.  Since term sheets are such a key part of the venture capital and M&A process, the SIGA decision illustrates the importance of carefully thinking through the details (or lack thereof) of a term sheet and their specific wording.  In particular, if at the time of a term sheet the parties are unsure of their intent, or wish to leave the negotiations open, to avoid potential damages awards appropriate disclaimers to any duty to negotiate in good faith should be included.

Of important note, in light of the SIGA decision, the Term Sheet for the NVCA Model Legal Documents has been updated to point out that the choice of law governing the term sheet should be considered more carefully.  (See footnote 1 (pasted below) to NVCA Term Sheet, found here).

If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email us.

Background

The SIGA decision arose in the context of negotiations between SIGA and PharmAthene (PA) relating to a potential collaboration.  At the outside of the process, SIGA was in a troubled financial state and was interested in licensing to PA rights to SIGA’s drug relating to smallpox.  While PA expressed interest in a merger, SIGA was not ready to commit to a merger process at that time.  The parties spent a number of months negotiating a detailed term sheet for a license agreement (“LATS”) which provided for a material terms, including those describing the worldwide exclusive license and sublicensing rights, various forms of upfront and milestone cash payments, funding guarantees and governance procedures. The LATS was not signed and had a footer that stated “Non Binding Terms.”

To add complexity to the matter, following the LATS, as the parties continued to negotiate, they entered into additional agreements.  PA provided SIGA with a $3 million bridge loan to provide SIGA with working capital while the merger negotiations proceeded.  The bridge loan agreement (governed by New York law) contained a provision obligating the parties to negotiate in good faith a license agreement “in accordance with the terms” set forth in the LATS if the merger were terminated.  Thereafter, SIGA and PA also into a Merger Agreement (governed by Delaware law) that contained the same provision as in the LATS requiring the parties to negotiate a license agreement in good faith in accordance with the terms LATS if the Merger Agreement were terminated.

After signing the Merger Agreement, SIGA’s financial position and prospects improved and it ultimately terminated the Merger Agreement.  While the parties then proceeded to negotiate the terms of the definitive license agreement, SIGA responded to a PA’s draft by proposing significant changes from the deal contemplated by the LATS.  The changes included a different profit splits, increased upfront payments ($100 million instead of $6 million, as specified in the LATS), and increased milestone payments ($235 million instead of $10 million, as specified in the LATS).  After SIGA conditioned any further discussions on PA’s agreement to negotiate without any preconditions regarding the binding nature of the LATS,  PA sued in the Delaware Chancery Court, asserting claims under theories of breach of contract, promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment.  After the Chancery court held in favor of PA on various grounds, SIGA appeal.

Legal Analysis

The Delaware Supreme Court held that that an express contractual obligation to negotiate in good faith is enforceable under Delaware law.  The Court affirmed the Chancery Court’s determination that SIGA acted in bad faith when it negotiated the license agreement in breach of its obligations under the Merger Agreement and the Bridge Loan Agreement.  The Court recited the standard for bad faith under Delaware law “is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather … the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.”

Looking to precedent from both Delaware and New York, the Court reasoned that parties that bind themselves to a concededly incomplete agreement “accept a mutual commitment to negotiate together in good faith in an effort to reach final agreement within the scope that has been settled in the preliminary agreement.”  While good faith differences in the negotiation of open issues may prevent reaching a final contract, a counterparty cannot in that case insist on conditions that do not conform to the preliminary agreement.

On that basis, the Court interpreted the language “in accordance with the terms set forth [in the LATS]” to mean that the parties had a duty to “negotiate toward a license agreement with economic terms substantially similar to the terms of the LATS (or at least not inconsistent with the LATS’s terms),” as opposed to using the LATS only a “jumping off point.”  Although the LATS was not signed and had the “Non-binding” footer language, the fact that it was incorporated into the Bridge Loan Agreement and Merger was evidence of intent to negotiate toward a license agreement with substantially similar economic terms in the event the merger was not closed.

 

This decision also establishes that under Delaware law, contract expectation damages are an appropriate remedy where parties have preliminarily agreed to the major terms of an agreement (a Type II agreement, as discussed) and have agreed to negotiate its conclusion in good faith, and the record supports that they would have reached agreement but for bad faith.

To reach its holding, the Court looked to decisions under New York law interpreting preliminary agreements, which provide for two types of such agreements: a “Type I” agreement and a “Type II” agreement.

  • A Type I agreement “is a fully binding preliminary agreement, which is created when the parties agree on all the points that require negotiation (including whether to be bound) but agree to memorialize their agreement in a more formal document. Such an agreement is fully binding….”
  • A Type II agreement is where parties “agree on certain major terms, but leave other terms open for further negotiation. … — a concededly incomplete agreement accept[ing] a mutual commitment to negotiate together in good faith in an effort to reach final agreement within the scope that has been settled in the preliminary agreement.”
    • A Type II agreement “does not commit the parties to their ultimate contractual objective but rather to the obligation to negotiate the open issues in good faith in an attempt to reach the alternate objective within the agreed framework.” A Type II agreement “does not guarantee” the parties will reach agreement on a final contract because of “good faith differences in the negotiation of the open issues” may preclude final agreement. A Type II agreement “does, however, bar a party from renouncing the deal, abandoning the negotiations, or insisting on conditions that do not conform to the preliminary agreement.

 

1.  NVCA Term Sheet FN. 1.  ”The choice of law governing a term sheet can be important because in some jurisdictions a term sheet that expressly states that it is nonbinding may nonetheless create an enforceable obligation to negotiate the terms set forth in the term sheet in good faith.  Compare SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., Case No. C.A. 2627 ( (Del. Supreme Court May 24, 2013) (holding that where parties agreed to negotiate in good faith in accordance with a term sheet, that obligation was enforceable notwithstanding the fact that the term sheet itself was not signed and contained a footer on each page stating “Non Binding Terms”);  EQT Infrastructure Ltd. v. Smith, 861 F. Supp. 2d 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Stanford Hotels Corp. v. Potomac Creek Assocs., L.P., 18 A.3d 725 (D.C. App. 2011) with Rosenfield v. United States Trust Co., 5 N.E. 323, 326 (Mass. 1935) (“An agreement to reach an agreement is a contradiction in terms and imposes no obligation on the parties thereo.”); Martin v. Martin, 326 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. App. 2010); Va. Power Energy Mktg. v. EQT Energy, LLC, 2012 WL 2905110 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2012).  As such, because a “nonbinding” term sheet governed by the law of a jurisdiction such as Delaware, New York or the District of Columbia may in fact create an enforceable obligation to negotiate in good faith to come to agreement on the terms set forth in the term sheet, parties should give consideration to the choice of law selected to govern the term sheet.”


California Adopts Three New Data Privacy and Security Laws Affecting Online Companies

Posted on Oct 22nd, 2013

In September 2013, California signed into effect three new laws relating to privacy and data breach. The first is online privacy bill A.B. 370 which amends the California Online Protection Act to add privacy policy disclosure requirements regarding online tracking activity by website operators.  This amendment goes into effect on January 1, 2014.

Under current California law, operators of commercial websites or online services (including mobile applications) that collect personally identifiable information (commonly referred to as “PII”) through the Internet about consumers residing in California who use or visit their commercial website or online service to conspicuously post a privacy policy on its website or online service and to comply with that policy.  The privacy policy is required to disclose the categories of PII that are collected and the categories of entities with whom such information is shared.

The 2013 law requires an operator that collects PII concerning a consumer’s online activities now also to disclose (1) how it responds to Web browser ‘do not track’ signals or other mechanisms that provide consumers the ability to exercise choice regarding the collection of a PII, and (2) whether third parties may also collect PII about an individual consumer’s online activities over time and across different websites when a consumer uses the operator’s website or service.

To be compliant with the new law, a privacy policy must not meet all of the following requirements:

(1) Identify the PII categories that the operator collects through the website or online service about individual consumers who use or visit its commercial website or online service and the categories of third-party persons or entities with whom the operator may share that PII.
(2) If the operator maintains a process for an individual consumer who uses or visits its commercial website or online service to review and request changes to any of the consumer’s PII that is collected through the website or online service, provide a description of that process.
(3) Describe the process by which the operator notifies consumers who use or visit its commercial website or online service of material changes to the operator’s applicable privacy policy.
(4) Identify its effective date.
(5) Disclose how the operator responds to Web browser “do not track” signals or other mechanisms that provide consumers the ability to exercise choice regarding the collection of PII about an individual consumer’s online activities over time and across third-party websites or online services, if the operator engages in that collection.
(6) Disclose whether other parties may collect personally identifiable information about an individual consumer’s online activities over time and across different websites when a consumer uses the operator’s website or service.
(7) An operator may satisfy the requirement of paragraph (5) by providing a clear and conspicuous hyperlink in the operator’s privacy policy to an online location containing a description, including the effects, of any program or protocol the operator follows that offers the consumer that choice.

The second new law is S.B. 46, which adds to the current data security breach notification requirements a new category of data triggering these notification requirements: A user name or email address, in combination with a password or security question and answer that would permit access to an online account. The new law also provides more guidance on how website operators can satisfy disclosure obligations when a breach involves personal information that allows access to an online or email account.  This law also goes into effect on January 1, 2014.

Finally, S.B. 568, relates to online privacy protection for minors. This law will prohibit online marketing or advertising of certain products and services (such as alcohol, tobacco, and U/V tanning products) to children and teenagers under 18.  This law goes into effect on January 1, 2015.

Impacted companies must take the opportunity presented before these laws come into effect to examine their data collection, data privacy, and security policies and practices to determine whether they demand any updates. If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email us.


Due Diligence Counts

Posted on Oct 5th, 2013

Private equity and venture capital funds who distinguish themselves as being “active investors” should take note of a recent First Circuit decision in the Sun Capital Partners III et al v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund decision where the could The First Circuit found a private equity fund can be jointly and severally liable for the unfunded pension obligations of companies in its portfolio where it took an active role in the company’s business.

The portfolio company in question, Scott Brass, Inc., went into bankruptcy and defaulted on its withdrawal obligations to the New England Teamsters &Trucking Industry Pension Fund (Teamsters) at a time when the company was held by two Sun Capital Funds. The Teamsters argued that the funds were jointly and severally liable for the Scott Brass obligations because they were engaged in a trade or business and were controlled by ERISA along with Scott Brass.

The Massachusetts federal district court disagreed in late 2012 and held that the Sun Capital funds were not trades or businesses, and were instead private investment funds whose only function was to receive investment income. The First Circuit, in a decision that was admittedly “fact specific”, reversed, reasoning that what might otherwise be a passive investment could qualify an investor to be a trade or business when it is coupled with certain activities. The court referred to this as the “investment plus” analysis but declined to establish specific guidelines for what those “certain activities” might be.

Factors that the court did mention include:

  • The general partners of the Sun Capital funds had hiring and firing authority and otherwise managed the day-to-day operations of their portfolio companies.
  • Sun Capital affiliates actively worked on improving and restructuring the portfolio in order to sell it at a better price. These affiliates also served on the boards of portfolio companies and held the majority of the seats on the Scott Brass board.
  • Sun Capital Fund IV in particular received management fees from Scott Brass.

These factors prompted the Court to render its decision as to Sun Capital Fund IV and to remand the case as to Sun Capital Fund III for a new “trade or business” analysis; the receipt of management fees from Scott Brass is a key consideration.

Even if ERISA work isn’t your area, this case is an important reminder that even well-crafted reps and warranties and corporate limited liability shields may not protect an investor from being pursued by creditors of a portfolio company, especially a bankrupt one. For legal issues such as funded and unfunded retirement plans covered by ERISA, there is no substitute for careful due diligence by specialized professionals. Second, investors who find themselves in a similar situation should seek guidance from the Sun Capital case on how to manage the investment without toeing the line that results in potential exposure to the fund managers and their assets.

If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email us.


Forum Selection Clause Valid in Delaware

Posted on Jun 29th, 2013

In a major win for corporations worried about choice of law, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that forum selection bylaws adopted by corporation boards are at least facially valid as a matter of contract under Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corporation stands for the proposition that bylaws which designate a specific forum for legal dispute resolution will stand up in court, taking some of the concern away for corporations in the realm of multiforum litigation.

In the case at bar, both Chevron and FedEx had adopted bylaws in their certificates of incorporation which indicated that Delaware would be the sole forum for any stockholder litigation. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge of these forum selection provisions and held that the DGCL in fact does permit this kind of forum designation contractually.

The court’s reasoning was in part that the DGCL permits corporations to regulate themselves in order to function smoothly, and these kinds of bylaws assisted the smooth governance of the corporation. The court also found that both federal and Delaware law rendered forum selection bylaws contractually enforceable. This finding is based on the fact that the charters of the corporations in question granted unilateral power to the boards to adopt bylaws, and that this binding power was known to stockholders.

If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email us.