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Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Rules on Cat’s Paw Theory

Posted on Jun 24th, 2023


A recent SJC decision in MARK A. ADAMS vs. SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC USA rules on the “cat’s paw” theory of liability.  Companies considering a reduction in force should be familiar with this decision and should discuss their plans with qualified employment counsel.

What is the Cat’s Paw theory:

The “cat’s paw” theory of liability refers to a legal concept where an employer can be held responsible for discriminatory actions taken by its employees, even if those employees were not the ultimate decision-makers. In this theory, the employer is considered to be the “cat” and the employee who carries out the discriminatory action is the “paw.” The idea is that the employer may use or rely on the biased actions or recommendations of its employees to accomplish its discriminatory purposes. Under the “cat’s paw” theory, the employer can be held liable for discrimination, even if the decision-maker was not directly motivated by discriminatory intent.

The theory is based on a fable  in which a monkey convinces a cat to retrieve chestnuts from a fire, and then makes off with the finished product, leaving the cat with a burned paw and no chestnuts.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cat%27s_paw_theory

More about the case:

Mark Adams sued his former employer, Schneider Electric USA, for age discrimination after being laid off in a 2017 reduction in force. Schneider Electric was initially granted summary judgment, but the Appeals Court reversed the decision. The Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review to clarify the summary judgment standards in employment discrimination cases. The court concluded that the grant of summary judgment was improper, as there was evidence to support the claim of a discriminatory corporate policy and the “cat’s paw” theory of liability.

Mark Adams produced several pieces of evidence to support his claim of age discrimination. First, he provided evidence that officials at Schneider Electric expressed a desire to increase “age diversity” in the company and specifically in the research and development (R&D) group where he worked. They wanted to hire recent college graduates and reduce the number of older employees.

Adams also presented evidence that his R&D group in Andover was targeted for layoffs while a younger R&D group in India was not. Human resources executives at Schneider Electric emphasized the need for age diversity and discussed making budget reductions to make room for younger employees.

Furthermore, Adams’s name appeared on a list that exemplified the policy of increasing age diversity, indicating that he was selected for the layoff based on his age. Additionally, statistical evidence showed that the layoffs had a disparate impact on employees over fifty years of age.

Overall, Adams provided evidence of discriminatory remarks by corporate executives, the targeting of his division for layoffs, and statistical evidence of age-based impact, all of which supported his claim of age discrimination

 


SJC issues key interpretive decision in employee-shareholder context

Posted on Mar 18th, 2014
Last week’s decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Selmark Associates et al. v. Ehrlich is a critical reminder to corporate lawyers and fiduciaries of the extensive protections of minority shareholders of Massachusetts corporations and the necessity for carefully drafted shareholder and employment agreements with shareholder employees in such companies.  Two key takeaways from this decision are as follows:
  • In closely held corporations, Massachusetts has long afforded minority shareholders the protection of a fiduciary duty owed to them by the other shareholders that is more extensive than other states, such as Delaware, for example.  While courts will allow shareholders to provide otherwise in written agreements, Selmark holds that if the shareholder agreements are not specifically on point, the fiduciary duty standard will apply.
  • Going the other way, Selmark holds that the solicitation of customers by a former employee shareholder (who is then still a shareholder) is also breach of such shareholder’s fiduciary duty to his fellow shareholders, even where the employment was terminated by the corporation and was considered a “freeze out” under corporate law.  While this holding certainly could give companies more leverage in separation discussions with former employee shareholders, the potential uncertainty created over the scope of such a non-solicitation duty that was not reduced to writing could present significant challenges to practitioners on both sides of the matter.

Because of the potential uncertainly to fiduciary duty claims added by this decision, parties on both sides would be well advised to address the issue of fiduciary duty head-on in their agreements, and to define as specifically as possible the scope of any limitations to that duty.  While this point is not addressed by the Court, both employers and employees may also consider the advantages (and disadvantages) of using holding companies and special purpose entities to separate the legal identity of the employee from that of the shareholder.

In addition, potential buyers and sellers of Massachusetts corporations should take note of this case in the planning of their transaction.

If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email us.

Background

They say that bad facts often make bad law.  If that is true, then this case certainly does not disappoint.  The case ultimately arises from a sudden (and apparently unwarranted) termination of employment of a shareholder employee, Ehrlich, who  had been a long term valued employee of Selmark and its affiliate Marathon.  Ehrlich originally was employed by Marathon and had informally been promised equity in the company by its founder.  As part of Marathon founder’s planned retirement and succession plan a number of years later, Erhlick entered into a series of agreements with the sole stockholder of Selmark (Elofson) involving the gradual sale of Marathon to Ehrlich and Selmark. These agreements comprised a stock purchase agreement, an employment agreement, a conversion agreement and a stock (shareholders) agreement.

The purchase agreement provided for the gradual acquisition of Marathon stock by the two purchasers through monthly payments pursuant to promissory notes. Upon full payment, Selmark would own 51% and Ehrlich 49%. Under the terms of the purchase agreement, Marathon bore primary responsibility for the monthly payments and Ehrlich and Selmark were each separate co-guarantors.

The employment agreement between Ehrlich and Marathon provided for a term of employment through 2002, with extension possible on the written agreement of the parties. Per its terms, Ehrlich became the vice-president of Marathon and potentially a director, and could only be terminated for cause. If the agreement was not extended, at the conclusion of the initial contract term, it would terminate and Ehrlich would be required to resign as an officer and director of Marathon.

Pursuant to a separate  conversion agreement, Ehrlich had the option, once he and Selmark fully paid off the purchase of Marathon, to convert what would his then 49% interest in Marathon into a 12.5% interest in Selmark (and then Selmark would own 100% of Marathon).  This agreement also required that, upon conversion, Selmark offer Ehrlich an employment agreement that would provide “for compensation, bonuses, expense payments, and benefits consistent with his percentage ownership of [Selmark].”  Independent of employment, upon conversion, Ehrlich was to become an officer of Selmark and member of its board of directors.

Under a separate “stock agreement”, if Ehrlich paid off his purchased stock and exercised his conversion option, Ehrlich’s rights as a minority stockholder of Selmark would be governed by that agreement.  This agreement provided both parties with the opportunity to end their business relationship through the sale of Ehrlich’s stock, which included a cross-purchase put and call rights for the parties.

After these agreements were executed, Marathon and Selmark remained separate entities, but presented themselves as “Selmark” to the outside world.  Ehrlich identified himself as a VP of Selmark even, while technically  he was an employee and vice-president of Marathon.  Ehrlich’s employment agreement expired by its terms in 2002, but Ehrlich remained an employee of Marathon and retained his position as vice-president. In 2003, Ehrlich began to report directly to Selmark’s management and received no complaints about his job performance.

In the summer of 2007, Ehrlich provided notice to Elofson that he intended to accelerate his final payments on his 49% share of Marathon stock by December 2007.  According to the Court, Elofson then decided that he did not want Erhlich as a business partner and in October 2007 informed Ehrlich that his employment with Marathon was terminated and offered for  Selmark to purchase Ehrlich’s 49% interest in Marathon for the same price he would have received had he converted his Marathon shares into Selmark stock and then Selmark had exercised its call rights pursuant to the stock agreement.  To assuage him to sell his shares, Elofson also told Ehrlich that Marathon did not have the cash-flow to support the continuing payments under the Notes, and that Ehrlich would have to meet the shortfall if he did not sell his shares to Elofson.

In November 2007, Ehrlich took a job with a competing manufacturer’s representative company and afterwards solicited some of Marathon’s customers. After his termination, Ehrlich received a small severance, but did not cash in his Marathon stock under the terms offered in the termination letter and remained a minority shareholder of Marathon.

Following his termination, Ehrlich did not believe that Marathon had insufficient funds to make its remaining payments under the notes.  Taking matters somewhat into his own hands, he suspended payments to Marathon which appears to have only complicated the parties disputed because of the default issues that arose.  While it appears that Ehrlich did eventually pay off his portion of the Notes and attempted to cure the default, the ambiguity over whether he perfected his conversion rights and his shareholder rights under the stock agreement added additional complexity to the dispute.

In 2008, Selmark and Marathon sued Ehrlich for breach of fiduciary duty for his solicitation of Marathon customers, and  Ehrlich responded with thirteen counterclaims against counterclaims, also including fiduciary duty claims.  At trial, the jury ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on their fiduciary duty claim, and in favor of Ehrlich (with respect to Selmark and Elofson) on his breach of contract, fiduciary duty and 93A counterclaims, netting a significant verdict in his favor.  (The trial judge also later doubled the 93A damages and awarded attorney’s fees. )  The parties then appealed.

Discussion

While many aspects of this decision are worth a careful reading in its original, unabridged version, the most interesting parts of this case for me relate to its holdings on the fiduciary duty issue.

1.  Fiduciary Duty owed to Ehrlich as an Employee Shareholder.  The jury found that Selmark and Elofson breached their fiduciary duties to Ehrlich in relation to the termination of his employment by Marathon.  Citing the long standing precedent in Massachusetts protecting minority stockholders in closely held corporations, the SJC held that a “freeze-out” can occur “when a minority shareholder is deprived of employment”.

Although the Court acknowledged that fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty may be inapplicable where the parties have negotiated a series of agreements intended to govern the terms of their relationship, the challenged conduct must be clearly contemplated by the terms of the written agreements.  The presence of a contract “will not always supplant a shareholder’s fiduciary duty, ” and when the contract does not entirely govern the other shareholders’ or directors’ challenged actions, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty may still lie.   To supplant the otherwise applicable fiduciary duties of parties in a close corporation, the terms of a contract must clearly and expressly indicate a departure from those obligations.

In this case, while the parties had entered into multiple, complex written agreements, the Court still held that none of these agreements covered the duties at issue.  The Court reasoned that none of the agreements contained terms that addressed Ehrlich’s employment rights upon expiration of his Marathon employment agreement and before conversion of his Marathon stock.  Finding that fiduciary duty did apply, the Court affirmed the trial court’s findings in favor of Ehrlich on these issues.  Among its reasoning, the Court noted that Elofson could have sought less harmful alternatives before resorting to termination, and cited precedent that a fellow shareholder employee is owed “real substance and communication, including efforts to resolve supposed complaints by less drastic measures than termination.”

2.  Fiduciary Duty owed by Ehrlich.   At trial, Marathon and Selmark argued that Ehrlich violated his fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty to Marathon when he solicited Marathon’s customers for his new employer. The jury agreed, and awarded them $240,000 in damages.  On appeal, Ehrlich contended that, because he was fired by Elofson and essentially “frozen out” of Marathon, he had the right to compete with Marathon without committing a breach of his fiduciary duties to the company.

Ruling in favor of the employer in this case, the Court cited long-standing precedent under Massachusetts law that  shareholders in close corporations owe fiduciary duties not only to one another, but to the corporation as well.  (See, e.g., Chambers v. Gold Medal Bakery, Inc., 464 Mass. 383, 394 (2013); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. at 593.)

At issue here was whether those fiduciary duties to the corporation continue once a shareholder has been “frozen out,” or wrongfully terminated, by that corporation.   Declining to follow precedent from the Supreme Court of Wyoming that held that a freeze out does extinguish such a duty, the Court held that the fiduciary duty does, in fact, survive a freeze out.  The Court saw what Ehrlich proposed as a “drastic step” and reasoned that “allowing a party who has suffered harm within a close corporation to seek retribution by disregarding its own duties has no basis in our laws and would undermine fundamental and long-standing fiduciary principles that are essential to corporate governance.”

Because the Court did not address what would be the scope and extent of such a duty, parties are still advised to address all such issues in a written non-solicitation agreement, which can define more precisely the specifics such as the term, geographic scope and other similar issues.

 

 

 

 

 


Massachusetts Appeals Court Rejects Stockholder Representative’s Appeal to Deny Partial Settlement Out of Escrow Fund

Posted on Dec 4th, 2013

A recent decision by the Massachusetts Appeals Court interprets the right of a seller shareholder to bypass a stockholders’ representative and settle directly with a buyer claimant and to use for such settlement the proceeds from an escrow fund established as part of the sale transaction.  This opinion is an important read for anyone engaged as a stockholders representative or serves as counsel to one.   While the decision is somewhat limited by the specific provisions of the merger and escrow agreements at issue, corporate practitioners may find the facts useful for tightening up standard provisions on these issues in future deals.  The case also provides a handy explanation of the oft-used (and misunderstood) term “power coupled with an interest”, which we have summarized below.  A full copy of the opinion can be found here.

The case arises from a stock purchase merger in September 2007 of Atlantis Components, Inc. by Astra Tech, Inc.  for $71 million. Per common practice, $6.3 million of the purchase price was placed into an escrow fund, to be disbursed to the former Atlantis shareholders on a pro rata basis on December 31, 2008, the release date. The purpose of the the escrow fund was to indemnify Astra Tech if it paid any claims asserted against Atlantis after the closing date but before the release date. The merger agreement designated a Shareholder Representative as the agent of the former Atlantis shareholders, which had the duty of approving or challenging any indemnification claim on the escrow fund.

Shortly after the closing, Astra Tech brought a claim against Atlantis for failing to disclose  certain correspondence alleging that Atlantis was infringing on the patents of one its competitors.   The parties disagreed on the merits of AstraTech’s claims and various lawsuits ensued.  As legal costs for these matters ballooned to nearly $2.5 million, in October 2010 certain of the Atlantis shareholders opted to settle directly with Astra Tech, using their pro rata share of the escrow fund as payment.  After reaching an agreement, the settling shareholders and Astra Tech moved in Superior Court for approval of their settlement. The shareholders’ agent opposed the settlement, on the basis that neither the merger agreement nor the escrow agreement permitted the settling shareholders to seek disbursement absent the consent of the shareholders’ agent. A judge approved the settlement agreement between Astra Tech and the settling shareholders and this appeal followed.

The Court’s decision involved the interpretation  and interplay of three contracts between the parties: (1) the escrow agreement between Astra Tech, Atlantis, the stockholders rep, and the escrow agent; (2) the merger agreement between Astra Tech, Atlantis, and the stockholders rep; and (3) the settlement agreement between Astra Tech and the settling shareholders.

On the escrow agreement, the Court determined that that the express provisions of that Agreement did provide for a procedural mechanism to allow the settling shareholders to seek court approval of their settlement.  An excerpt of that provision is provided below for reference. (1)

On the merger agreement, the stockholders rep argued that it had the exclusive right to negotiate with Astra Tech under under Sections 8.6(a) and (e) (pasted as footnote (2) below).  While the Court agreed that these provisions granted the Stockholders Rep with broad powers to negotiate and make decisions for the settling shareholders, it held that these rights were not exclusive, which would be required to bar the settling shareholders from negotiating for themselves.  The Court refused to construe the provision that the rep’s decisions and acts “constitute a decision of all Company shareholders” and are “final, binding and conclusive upon each such Company Shareholder” as granting the rep with exclusive rights.   To create an exclusive agency, the parties must expressly and unambiguously indicate such an intent in the contract.”  The Court noted that if the parties had wished to give the shareholders’ agent the sole or exclusive authority to negotiate on behalf of the settling shareholders, they should have provided for that expressly in the contract. (“We will not contort the plain language of the merger agreement to interpret “final, binding and conclusive” as synonymous with “irrevocable” or “exclusive.”)

Finally, the stockholders rep contended that its agency was irrevocable because it has a “power coupled with an interest.”  The Court disagreed.   Despite general agency law principles (which allow a creator of the agency relationship to revoke the agent’s authority at any time, even if their agreement expressly states that the principal may not revoke), the agent’s authority can be made irrevocable when it is a “power coupled with an interest”.  The Court explained that a ”power coupled with an interest is not technically an agency relationship because “it is neither given for, nor exercised for, the benefit of the person who creates it.”  In an agency relationship, granting authority to the agent is solely for the benefit of the principal, but when a “power is coupled with an interest, the donee holds that power for his own benefit (or for the benefit of a third party), but not for the benefit of the donor.”  The reference to “interest” in this phrase means that the agent (donee of the power) must have a present interest in the property upon which the power is to operate.  It is generally accepted that the “interest” must be ownership of the property itself and it is this ownership which makes the power irrevocable.

In its analysis, the Court broke down the term “a power coupled with an interest”  into two components: first, does the agent have “a power”, and second, is the power “coupled with an interest.  On the first point, the Court held that the  rep did not have “a power” in the escrow fund, as it did not have  exclusive or irrevocable power under the merger agreement or the escrow agreement.  The rep also did not have unilateral power in the escrow fund (a distinguishing factor in other cases cited by the Court) but rather was required to reach an agreement with Astra Tech before the escrow agent could be compelled to release the funds.

On the second point, the stockholders rep did not have “an interest” in the escrow fund sufficient to create a power coupled with an interest.  Citing cases going back to 1823, the common thread requires the agent to have title or some other form of ownership of the underlying asset to assert that the power is “coupled with an interest”.   Even though the shareholders rep (as a Atlantis shareholder) had a personal interest in a portion of the escrow, it did not have a property interest in the entire fund in its capacity as shareholders’ agent.  The Court emphasized that the critical distinction between an agent and the donee of a power coupled with an interest lies in who receives the benefit of the relationship. “In a principal-agent relationship, the principal receives the benefit; for a power coupled with an interest, the benefit inures to the donee himself (or to a third party), but not to the donor.”

After concluding that the stockholders rep had neither the exclusive right to negotiate under the merger agreement nor a power coupled with an interest in the entire escrow fund, it then held that the settling shareholders did have a right to bypass the rep and enter into a direct settlement with Astra Tech.  In the absence of an agreement, the settling shareholders retain their common-law rights as principals. Notwithstanding any agreement between principal and agent, an agent’s actual authority terminates … if the principal revokes the agent’s actual authority by a manifestation to the agent. Because a principal may revoke part of the agent’s authority, it follows that a principal may, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, negotiate on his own behalf without infringing on the agent’s ability to perform his duties.  Because nothing in the agreements abrogated these common-law rights, the Court held that the settling shareholders had the power to negotiate a settlement agreement with Astra Tech.

This opinion illustrates a number of interesting drafting points for preparing escrow and stockholder rep provisions in complex merger and sale agreements.  At the very least, practitioner may wish to counsel their clients on the alternatives of exclusive and nonexclusive roles of the rep and the possible ways those results can be effected.  Based on this decision, it appears likely that a Massachusetts court facing a similar issue will construe these agreements strictly and will require the exclusivity and revocability to be expressly stated to be enforceable.

If you have any questions regarding the issues discussed in this point, please feel free to contact us.

Footnotes:

 

(1) ”Any Disputed Claim and any other dispute which may arise under this Escrow Agreement with respect to the rights of [Astra Tech] or any other Indemnified Party and the Shareholders’ Agent or the Company Securityholders to the Escrow Fund shall be settled by mutual agreement of [Astra Tech] and the Shareholders’ Agent (evidenced by joint written instructions signed by [Astra Tech] and the Shareholders’ Agent and delivered to the Escrow Agent); provided, however, that upon receipt of a copy of a final and nonappealable order of a court of competent jurisdiction with respect to payment of all or any portion of the Escrow Fund, … the Escrow Agent shall deliver the portion of the Escrow Fund specified in such award or order to [Astra Tech] or other Indemnified Party and/or the Shareholders’ Agent for the benefit of the Company Securityholders as directed in such award or order.”

(2)  ”[T]he Shareholders’ Agent shall be, and hereby is, appointed and constituted in respect of each Company Securityholder, as his, her or its agent, to act in his, her or its name, place and stead, as such Company Securityholder’s attorney-in-fact, as more fully set forth in this Section 8.6. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the Shareholders’ Agent shall be constituted and appointed as agent for and on behalf of the Company shareholders to give and receive notices and communications, to authorize delivery to [Astra Tech] of the monies from the Escrow Fund in satisfaction of claims by [Astra Tech] Indemnified Persons against the Escrow Fund, to object to such deliveries, to agree to, negotiate, enter into settlements and compromises of, and demand arbitration and comply with orders of courts and awards of arbitrators with respect to such claims, and to take all actions necessary or appropriate in the judgment of the Shareholders’ Agent for the accomplishment of the foregoing.” [FN13]

Section 8.6(e) further delineates the actions that may be taken by the shareholders’ agent:

“A decision, act, consent or instruction of the Shareholders’ Agent shall constitute a decision of all Company shareholders … and shall be final, binding and conclusive upon each such Company shareholder, and the Escrow Agent and [Astra Tech] may rely upon any decision, act, consent or instruction of the Shareholders’ Agent as being the decision, act, consent or instruction of each and every such Company shareholder.”

 

 


E-commerce Expands Personal Jurisdiction for Businesses

Posted on Dec 3rd, 2013

A recent Massachusetts Appeals Court decision impacts businesses that deal with out of state companies, an issue that is much more common today thanks to the advent of e-commerce. Diamond Group, Inc. v. Selective Distribution International, Inc. expands personal jurisdiction and allows a Massachusetts business lawsuit to move forward against a Long Island company. The finding is based on the orders placed over emails between the two businesses.

Diamond, a Massachusetts company, sued Selective Distribution in a Massachusetts court for 45 unpaid invoices. Selective Distribution, a Long Island business, filed a motion to dismiss based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. The argument Selective made was the standard “minimum contacts” argument from the 1945 International Shoe case: the business had no presence in Massachusetts, and all deliveries it received came to its warehouses in New York and New Jersey.

The Court examined the International Shoe criteria and based its decision within them, albeit expanding them. First, the Court found that the series of email orders itself constitutes “purposeful availment” of Massachusetts commercial activity. Distinguishing this case from others in which personal jurisdiction was found absent based on the International Shoe standards, the Court explained that this ongoing pattern was far different than cases where single purchases or isolated transactions were involved. In contrast, Selective was a regular and active participant in Massachusetts commercial circles and this deliberate and routine involvement signaled that “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” would not be offended by the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the business.

Whether or not the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court will accept further appellate review is up in the air. For now, the clear take away is that doing business online with out of state companies can open your business up to liability in other states if this expanded understanding of personal jurisdiction holds up. This case is an important reminder of the benefits of including a governing law and dispute resolution clause in your contract forms to provide for a favorable locale as the exclusive forum for any proceedings to take place.

If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email us.


Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interprets Investor’s Right to Recover for Misstatements

Posted on Aug 12th, 2013

A recent SJC decision involving a personal investment by Jack Welch in a failed Massachusetts hedge fund. The full decision can be read here.  Welch sued the fund and its manager for their failure to disclose that the manager was involved in a civil litigation (a landlord-tenant dispute over a former residency of the manager in New York), claiming that if he had known about that matter, he never would have invested.

The SJC upheld the summary judgment entered against Welch, holding that omission ultimately was not material enough to find the fund liable.
This case is interesting for its confirmation of certain provisions under the Massachusetts law on the following issues:

  • The statutory standard of a misstatement or omission is material  under the Massachusetts Securities Act is whether there is a “substantial likelihood” that the omitted information would have “significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information” available to the ordinary reasonable investor.
  • A “material” fact is oneA “material” fact is one to which a reasonable person would attribute importance for his or her choice of action in the transaction at issue. Zimmerman v. Kent, 31 Mass.App.Ct. 72, 78 (1991).
  • The court also held that if there is finding in this regard under the Uniform Securities Act, then there cannot be a finding that the actions were deceptive under Chapter 93A.
  • The decision also provides a helpful summary of Massachusetts common law on fraud and negligent misrepresentation:
    • Intentional misrepresentation (or “deceit”): (a) an intentional or reckless (b) misstatement (c) of an existing fact (d) of a material nature, (e) causing intended reasonable reliance and (f) financial harm to the plaintiff.
    • Negligent misrepresentation: (a) a provision, in the course of the defendant’s business, profession, employment, or in the course of a transaction of his pecuniary interest, (b) of false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, (c) without the exercise of reasonable care or competence in the acquisition or communication of the information, (d) causing justifiable reliance by, and (e) resulting in pecuniary loss to, the plaintiff.

If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email me directly.   My email address is dimitry.herman@hermanlawllc.com.

 

 


Managers of LLCs Can Be Individually Liable for Unpaid Wages

Posted on Jun 14th, 2013

 

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently held that managers of LLCs can be held liable individually for unpaid wages under the Massachusetts Wage Act. Specifically, a “manager who ‘controls, directs, and participates to a substantial degree in formulating and determining’ the financial policy of a business entity may be a ‘person having employees in his service’ under G.L. c. 149, § 148, and thus may be subject to liability for violations of the Wage Act,” [citations omitted].

The issue before the court was whether the legislative intent was to include managers of LLCs in the group of possible violators of the Massachusetts Wage Act, and the court found that it did. The court found a clear legislative intent to hold all individuals who contribute to a business’ fiscal and employment policies responsible for how employees are treated.

What does this mean for day to day business? LLCs of all sizes now have one more thing to consider when taking out director and officer and employee practices liability insurance. Since these kinds of policies are crucial to risk management for any business and this case signals a new kind of risk, this case should be on your radar.

If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email us.


Recent Massachusetts Appeals Court Decision Interprets Enforceability of Online Terms and Conditions

Posted on May 9th, 2013

A recent Massachusetts appeals court decision by holds that a forum selection and limitation of liability clause is not enforceable under Massachusetts law in a browsewrap agreement.  This decision is a useful read both for lawyers drafting these documents and product developers and UI folks that create the user experience during which these legal terms are viewed and accepted.

The case involves the interpretation of Yahoo!’s Terms of Service (TOS) relating to its free email service.  The case was brought by the administrators of the estate of a Yahoo email user to get court approval for access to the account and the content of the emails.  Because the Yahoo! TOS had a forum selection clause requiring that all disputes be brought in California, the Court had the opportunity to interpret the enforceability under Massachusetts law of such clauses in online agreements.

After noting that the Court has not previously considered the enforceability of forum selection and limitation of liability clauses in online agreements, it looked to the case law on such issues in traditional paper contracts.  In those cases, courts have enforced such provisions as long as they have been reasonably communicated and accepted and if, considering all the circumstances, it is reasonable to enforce the provision at issue.  The burden on the first prong fall on the issuer of the TOS.  On the second prong (that the TOS themselves were reasonable), in the forum selection case, the burden falls on the plaintiffs, and no such burden applies in case of a limitations provision.

Applying this standard to online agreements, the Court held that Yahoo! did not meet their burden of showing the TOS were reasonably communicated and accepted.  Yahoo!’s affidavit that users were “given an opportunity to review” the TOS and Privacy Policy prior to registering” was not sufficient by itself.  The Court could not infer from that affidavit that the TOS were actually displayed on the user’s screen.  If the user was asked to follow a link to the TOS — which is a pretty typical user experience — Yahoo!’s affidavit would have to have provided the specific instructions relating to the link, how prominently displayed was the link, and any other information bearing on the reasonableness of this communication.

The Court also held that Yahoo! failed in showing that the TOS were accepted.  Past cases have enforced such provisions only in click-wrap agreements (where “terms of the agreement were displayed, at least in part, on the user’s computer screen and the user was required to signify his or her assent by clicking ‘I accept.’”), but not in browsewrap agreements (where ”website terms and conditions of use are posted on the website typically as a hyperlink at the bottom of the screen.”).

On that basis, the Court refused to extend the enforceability to browsewrap agreements and held that the record did not show “the terms of any agreement were reasonably communicated or that they were accepted.”

This case is reminder that legal attention to one’s online form agreements is a necessary part of operating a web-based business.  Especially if the offering is free (or fremium), website owners should take appropriate caution, and may want to sacrifice a little user experience and customer conversion in favor of knowing that to ensure that those online terms and conditions are actually going to be enforceable when the time comes.


Recent MA SJC Noteworthy Decision, so to speak

Posted on Apr 19th, 2013

A recent decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is noteworthy for transactional practitioners:

In T. Butera Auburn vs. Williams, the Court held that a purchaser of a veterinary business was not entitled to withhold payment on a promissory note issued in connection with the purchase of defendant’s business.  The case involved the purchase of a veterinary clinic business from the defendant via an asset purchase agreement, where $800,000 was paid at the closing, the another $400,000 was payable via a promissory note over 15 years.  According to the decision, when plaintiffs discovered that the defendant was in violation of her covenant not to compete and other post-closing obligations, they brought suit and sought to hold back payment on the note to set off their damages.  Plaintiffs argued that they were excused from performance under the Note based on language on the APA that a default under a related transaction document (such as the Note) would be a default under the APA.  The Court rejected this argument, noting that this case involved the opposite scenario.  Here the breach occurred under the APA provisions, not the Note, and the Note did not contain a cross-default provision that would have potentially allowed the Plaintiffs to stop payment.  The Court did comment however, that if the plaintiffs could have shown that “the damaged business itself was supposed to generate the income from which the debt … was to be repaid, [the defendant] might well be estopped from obtaining judicially compelled acceleration on the basis that the Note was breached when payments were not subsequently made on time by the borrower.”

This case is a useful reminder that:

  • cross-default provisions and rights for setoff in the event of an indemnification or other claim should be included in Notes and other transactional documents
  • Language such as that quoted below may be helpful to add as an acknowledgment to a remedies section in the transaction documents to prevent a similar result

 


Recent decision by Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Strictly Construes Transfer Restrictions and Co-Sale Rights in S Corporation

Posted on Apr 19th, 2013

 

Since the 1974 landmark decision in Donohue v. Rodd, Massachusetts courts have held that majority stockholders in close corporations owe minority stockholders a fiduciary duty akin to that owed in a partnership. This type of duty has been relied up to protect minority shareholders from squeeze-out or freeze-out scenarios. It has also been used as an offensive tactic to argue for implied rights of shareholders that are not expressly provided in the corporate documents, such as the articles of organization, bylaws or shareholder agreements.

In Merriam, et. al. v. Demoulas Supermarkets, Inc., the Supreme Judicial Court refused to extend the duties provided under Donohue v. Rodd to restrict stock transfers that were not expressly restricted under the Corporation’s governing documents.

While a fiduciary duty may exist, the Court encouraged shareholders of close corporations to enter into a shareholder agreement or specify in the corporate bylaws “rights, protections, and procedures that define the scope of their fiduciary duty in foreseeable situations.” The Court held that good faith compliance with the specific terms will not implicate that fiduciary duty. “A claim for breach of fiduciary duty may arise only where the agreement does not entirely govern the shareholder’s actions.”

In this case the plaintiffs attempted to use the concept of fiduciary duty in a creative way to prevent the transfer of stock because the corporation was an S corporation and the transfer could blow the S election. After reviewing the shareholder agreement and bylaws, the Court held that the challenged actions fell within the scope of those agreements – which did not restrict such a transfer – and that the fiduciary duty was not implicated in this case.

The court also rejected the argument that the fiduciary duty could be used to create an implied right of first offer or co-sale rights on a transfer to a third party. Transfer restrictions are to be construed narrowly in Massachusetts, and the Court reasoned that had the parties intended to create such rights and restrictions, they would have stated so expressly in their shareholder agreement.

Certainly, this decision does not present any major news to most corporate practitioners. While it is nice to know that shareholder agreements are still given weight in Massachusetts, the key takeaway is the importance of having such an agreement in the first place. Close corporations, particularly those with employee shareholders, should be strongly encouraged to enter into detailed shareholder agreements to provide for situations dealing with transfers, rights of first refusal, preemptive rights and potential divorce and dissolution. Majority stockholders may feel some reluctance to spend money and time on such a document, when the protection is often for their fellow stockholders. However, as shown by this decision, not having such an agreement will subject everyone to the vague principles of applicable fiduciary duties, which could have wide-ranging and negative implications.

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Recent Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision summarizes Massachusetts Law on Statute of Limitations on Promissory Notes and Successor Liability

Posted on Apr 17th, 2013

If you look at promissory note in your form file, odds are that the signature line indicates that the note was signed “under seal.” Aside from custom, there are several reasons why this somewhat archaic language was included. The most important reason, at least in Massachusetts, was that the language elevated the note from a plain contract to a sealed instrument. This extended the statute of limitations relating to the Note from six years to twenty.

In 1998, in connection with the revision of Article 3 of the UCC, Massachusetts adopted G. L. C. 106, § 3-118, which provided for a uniform six year statute of limitations for all negotiable instruments. In its recent decision in Premier Capital, LLC v. KMZ, LLC, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that Section 3-118 governs all negotiable instruments, sealed and unsealed. However, to the extent that a cause of action predates this adoption of law, the Court held that the law in effect prior to 1998 will apply. As there are probably few instruments still lying around that predate this adoption, odds are that we may start see the “under seal” language slowly disappear from these types of documents.

The other significant aspect of this decision is the Court’s concise restatement of Massachusetts law on successor liability. (The issue in the case was whether a promissory note could be enforced against KMZ, an entity that the plaintiff claimed to be a successor in interest to Max Zeller Furs, Inc., the party that signed the original note.)

First, in order to be deemed a “successor corporation”, there must be a transfer to that entity of “all or substantially” of another corporation.

If the first test is met, then to impose liability on the successor corporation, one of the following factors must also be met:

  • the successor assumes the predecessor’s liability expressly or impliedly
  • the transaction is a “de facto merger”
  • the succession is merely a continuation of the predecessor, or
  • the transaction is really just a fraudulent attempt by the predecessor to avoid liability.

Here, the Court affirmed the ruling in favor of the defendants, holding that there were no undisputed facts proving that Zeller transferred “all, or substantially all” of its assets to KMZ. While Premier argued that Zeller transferred its good will to KMZ, it could not show any actual agreement memorializing that transfer. The court also held that engaging in the same business and having the same stockholders, without meeting the transfer test, was not enough.

The take away from this case is that successor liability can only be established with a clear showing of facts within the established guidelines of the case law. Courts are not likely to find successor liability for purposes of summary judgment without undisputed proof of transfer of liability.

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