By: Richard Gauthier

A recent decision by the Massachusetts federal district court held that Massachusetts corporate law relating to fiduciary duty does not apply to Delaware corporations doing business in Massachusetts.  As most privately held tech-based companies started in Massachusetts are typically formed in Delaware and qualified here as a foreign corporation, this decision, while not surprising, provided comfort and clarity on this important issue.

Paul Nahass, a shareholder and former director and officer of FlexLite Corporation, sued a group of FlexLite shareholders, for terminating him as an officer and director of FlexLite.  Nahass alleged the termination violated their fiduciary duty to Nahass as a minority shareholder in a close corporation and FlexLite’s corporate bylaws.  Nahass argued that because FlexLite was a close corporation, under the famous Massachusetts Donohue v. Rodd decision, the other shareholders owed him a fiduciary duty that he claimed was breached.

The Court rejected this argument.  Pursuant to the Massachusetts “internal affairs” doctrine, the law of the state of incorporation applies to disputes over the internal workings of a corporation, including allegations that majority shareholders breached a fiduciary duty to shareholders. Because FlexLite is a Delaware corporation, The Court held that Massachusetts law does not apply.

The Court then went on to clarify that, unlike Massachusetts, under Delaware law shareholders in a close corporation do not have a fiduciary duty to each other.  Instead, Delaware courts have expressly rejected the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s reasoning.  The Court noted that some Delaware courts have held that “majority stockholders have fiduciary duties to minority stockholders as stockholders …” in certain circumstances, which were not alleged in this case.[1]

The Court also upheld Nahass’ removal from the FlexLite board that was effected by a written consent of stockholders.  While he claimed the corporate bylaws entitled him to a stockholder vote, the Court rejected this argument based on the provisions in the DGCL and the corporate bylaws that permitted action by written consent.

Tags: board of directors, corporate bylaws, fiduciary duty, FlexLite, foreign corporation, freeze-out, internal affairs doctrine, majority stockholders, minority stockholders, squeeze-out, startup

In a major win for corporations worried about choice of law, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that forum selection bylaws adopted by corporation boards are at least facially valid as a matter of contract under Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corporation stands for the proposition that bylaws which designate a specific forum for legal dispute resolution will stand up in court, taking some of the concern away for corporations in the realm of multiforum litigation.

In the case at bar, both Chevron and FedEx had adopted bylaws in their certificates of incorporation which indicated that Delaware would be the sole forum for any stockholder litigation. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge of these forum selection provisions and held that the DGCL in fact does permit this kind of forum designation contractually.

The court’s reasoning was in part that the DGCL permits corporations to regulate themselves in order to function smoothly, and these kinds of bylaws assisted the smooth governance of the corporation. The court also found that both federal and Delaware law rendered forum selection bylaws contractually enforceable. This finding is based on the fact that the charters of the corporations in question granted unilateral power to the boards to adopt bylaws, and that this binding power was known to stockholders.

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Tags: articles of incorporation, Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund, Chevron Corporation, choice of law, corporate bylaws, corporate governance, corporate law, Delaware Chancery Court, Delaware General Corporation Law, delaware law, DGCL, forum selection, multiforum litigation, stockholder litigation