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Recent Delaware Chancery Court Decisions Opines on Arbitration Clause in Merger Agreement

Posted on Oct 1st, 2013

A recent letter opinion by the Delaware Chancery Court in a case between Shareholder Representative Services (SRS) and a buyer of a business processing business raises an interesting interpretation of an arbitration clause in a merger agreement. The case can be read here.  The dispute between the parties arose from indemnification claims brought by the buyer under the merger agreement, which SRS claimed did not comply with the requirements of the merger agreement.  While the merger agreement contained a mandatory arbitration provision, it also provided that the Arbitrator did not have authority to grant “injunctive relief, specific performance or other equitable relief”.  Relying on this provision, SRS brought various claims in the Chancery Court, including a claim for injunctive relief to stop buyer from a breach of the merger agreement by seeking indemnification to which it did not have a right.  The court disagreed with SRS and compelled arbitration.

The court first noted that since the arbitration clause did not explicitly commit the determination of substantive arbitrability to the arbitrator, the court had jurisdiction to decide on this specific issue.  In a footnote, the court noted that these issues are presumptively determined by a court.  (One drafting note from this determination is that parties that wish to avoid any court proceedings altogether may want expressly cover the issue of substantive arbitrability in their agreement.)

The court cited a 2002 Delaware Supreme Court decision for the steps to be taken by a Delaware court to assess an arbitration clause:

  • First, the court must determine whether the arbitration clause is broad or narrow in scope.
  • Second, the court must apply the relevant scope of the provision to the asserted legal claim to determine whether the claim falls within the scope of the contractual provisions that require arbitration. If the court is evaluating a narrow arbitration clause, it will ask if the cause of action pursued in court directly relates to a right in the contract. If the arbitration clause is broad in scope, the court will defer to arbitration on any issues that touch on contract rights or  contract performance.

The court cited a few examples of a “broad” arbitration clause:  “any dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or in connection with the …Agreement” and “any unresolved controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement” (the language at issue in the parties’ merger agreement). Finding this clause to be of the broad category, the court ruled that the determination of whether the indemnification claims were time-barred should be made by the arbitrator.

In support of its argument, SRS cited a 2006 decision involving an arbitration clause in a LLC operating agreement where the parties also sought injunctive relief from the court to compel a member to assent to a capital contribution.  The court distinguished this situation from the instance case, finding that SRS’s claims were really legal claims, not equitable ones, and colorfully noted that “[s]emantic legerdemain does not transform a legal claim into an equitable claim.”  The court reasoned that the relief that SRS has requested requires an analysis of the merits of the claims, which is legal (as opposed to equitable) in nature.   Accordingly, a plaintiff cannot “convert a claim for money damages arising from a breach of commercial contract . . . into a claim maintainable in equity by the expedient of asking that the defendant be enjoined from breaching such duty again.”

This decision is a useful reminder that boilerplate provisions such as arbitration clauses (and carveouts to those clauses) should be carefully considered in the context of any agreement, especially one relating to the sale of a business or other major transaction of a company.  While there may be varying opinions on the benefits of arbitration over litigation, once a path is chosen, the parties should carefully review these provisions to reduce ambiguity around any substantive and procedural issues that may arise.

If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email us.

 


Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interprets Investor’s Right to Recover for Misstatements

Posted on Aug 12th, 2013

A recent SJC decision involving a personal investment by Jack Welch in a failed Massachusetts hedge fund. The full decision can be read here.  Welch sued the fund and its manager for their failure to disclose that the manager was involved in a civil litigation (a landlord-tenant dispute over a former residency of the manager in New York), claiming that if he had known about that matter, he never would have invested.

The SJC upheld the summary judgment entered against Welch, holding that omission ultimately was not material enough to find the fund liable.
This case is interesting for its confirmation of certain provisions under the Massachusetts law on the following issues:

  • The statutory standard of a misstatement or omission is material  under the Massachusetts Securities Act is whether there is a “substantial likelihood” that the omitted information would have “significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information” available to the ordinary reasonable investor.
  • A “material” fact is oneA “material” fact is one to which a reasonable person would attribute importance for his or her choice of action in the transaction at issue. Zimmerman v. Kent, 31 Mass.App.Ct. 72, 78 (1991).
  • The court also held that if there is finding in this regard under the Uniform Securities Act, then there cannot be a finding that the actions were deceptive under Chapter 93A.
  • The decision also provides a helpful summary of Massachusetts common law on fraud and negligent misrepresentation:
    • Intentional misrepresentation (or “deceit”): (a) an intentional or reckless (b) misstatement (c) of an existing fact (d) of a material nature, (e) causing intended reasonable reliance and (f) financial harm to the plaintiff.
    • Negligent misrepresentation: (a) a provision, in the course of the defendant’s business, profession, employment, or in the course of a transaction of his pecuniary interest, (b) of false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, (c) without the exercise of reasonable care or competence in the acquisition or communication of the information, (d) causing justifiable reliance by, and (e) resulting in pecuniary loss to, the plaintiff.

If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email me directly.   My email address is dimitry.herman@hermanlawllc.com.

 

 


Forum Selection Clause Valid in Delaware

Posted on Jun 29th, 2013

In a major win for corporations worried about choice of law, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that forum selection bylaws adopted by corporation boards are at least facially valid as a matter of contract under Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corporation stands for the proposition that bylaws which designate a specific forum for legal dispute resolution will stand up in court, taking some of the concern away for corporations in the realm of multiforum litigation.

In the case at bar, both Chevron and FedEx had adopted bylaws in their certificates of incorporation which indicated that Delaware would be the sole forum for any stockholder litigation. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge of these forum selection provisions and held that the DGCL in fact does permit this kind of forum designation contractually.

The court’s reasoning was in part that the DGCL permits corporations to regulate themselves in order to function smoothly, and these kinds of bylaws assisted the smooth governance of the corporation. The court also found that both federal and Delaware law rendered forum selection bylaws contractually enforceable. This finding is based on the fact that the charters of the corporations in question granted unilateral power to the boards to adopt bylaws, and that this binding power was known to stockholders.

If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email us.


Massachusetts Appeals Court Holds that Mass Wage Act Applies to Remote Employees

Posted on Jun 21st, 2013

A Massachusetts Appeals Court ruled today that an employee’s private right of action under the Massachusetts Wage Act under G.L. c. 149, § 148 did apply in the case of a traveling salesman who rarely set foot in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This choice of law case basically states that where the Commonwealth has a close connection to the employment relationship of the parties, local law should be applied to the claim.

In this case the plaintiff worked as a salesperson Starbak, Inc., a Delaware corporation that had its a sole place of business in Massachusetts. He resided in Florida and conducted most of his sales activity across the country for Starbal. When Starbak closed its doors, it terminated his employment with significant commissions outstanding. The plaintiff then brought suit against the company’s chief executive officer, a Massachusetts resident, seeking unpaid sales commissions of more than $100,000, certain unreimbursed expenses, wages in lieu of accrued vacation time, treble damages, and attorney’s fees. The question here was whether Massachusetts law would apply given that the plaintiff rarely visited the state.

The Court found that the nature of the plaintiff’s work was such that only Massachusetts was tied to it. The employment agreement governing the work relationship provided that Massachusetts law would be applied in the event of a dispute. Starbak was located there and as a result customers who dealt with the plaintiff entered into business with the company in Massachusetts. The plaintiff’s business cards identified his contact information as the same as Starbak’s, based in Massachusetts. His paychecks were issued from Massachusetts, and he communicated with the company daily. The plaintiff was in fact required to return to Massachusetts several times each year, and when he did return he would generally work in the same office space each time.

While distinguishing a case cited by the defendant where the Wage Act was not applied to an Australian employee operating outside the United States, importantly, the Court did acknowledge that the application of the Wage Act may be different in the case on a non-US employee.

This case should caution businesses that employ workers from a distance. While it does not seem to indicate that all remote employees will always be able to access remedies afforded by the local law of the businesses they work for, this is certainly something for businesses to consider when drafting employment agreements and establishing relationships with remote workers.

If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email us.


Managers of LLCs Can Be Individually Liable for Unpaid Wages

Posted on Jun 14th, 2013

 

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently held that managers of LLCs can be held liable individually for unpaid wages under the Massachusetts Wage Act. Specifically, a “manager who ‘controls, directs, and participates to a substantial degree in formulating and determining’ the financial policy of a business entity may be a ‘person having employees in his service’ under G.L. c. 149, § 148, and thus may be subject to liability for violations of the Wage Act,” [citations omitted].

The issue before the court was whether the legislative intent was to include managers of LLCs in the group of possible violators of the Massachusetts Wage Act, and the court found that it did. The court found a clear legislative intent to hold all individuals who contribute to a business’ fiscal and employment policies responsible for how employees are treated.

What does this mean for day to day business? LLCs of all sizes now have one more thing to consider when taking out director and officer and employee practices liability insurance. Since these kinds of policies are crucial to risk management for any business and this case signals a new kind of risk, this case should be on your radar.

If you have any questions about this topic, please feel free to email us.


Recent NY Court Decision on Rescission of Stock Option Agreement

Posted on May 12th, 2013

Employee stock options are an essential component of compensation in technology companies.  Options and other equity incentives allow employers to attract and retain talented personnel who hope to profit from a successful sale of the business that they help create.  While there has been substantial attention in recent years to the manner in which options are awarded, a topic less often discussed, but equally important, is how they may be rightfully terminated by an employer following a separation.  A recent decision by a New York appellate court’s decision in Lenel Systems Intl. v. Smith illustrates what can arise if this issue is not expressly addressed in the option agreement.

In Lenel, an employer sought to terminate an employee’s stock options who had violated his noncompetition agreement after leaving Lenel’s employment.  While the stock option agreement did not have an express provision entitling the company to terminate the agreement, it did provide that the employee’s agreement not to compete was consideration for the options.  Not having the express right to terminate, the employer sought to rescind the option on equitable grounds.

The court summarized that rescission is an equitable remedy that allows a court to declare a contract void from its inception.  As a general rule, rescission of a contract is permitted where there is a breach of contract that is material and willful, or so substantial and fundamental “as to strongly tend to defeat the object of the parties in making the contract.”  The court rejected the defendant’s argument that an express forfeiture clause in the option agreement was required in order for option to be subject to rescission.  Instead, the court reasoned that the noncompetition covenant was the sole consideration for the option agreement, and when the defendant chose to compete with Lenel “in violation of the only material condition of the agreements,” he would give up his right to the stock options promised in exchange.

In is also worth noting that two of the appellate judges dissented from this decision, arguing that the consideration for the option consisted of two parts, one being the compliance with the covenant during the term of employment and the other part for the post-termination period.  The dissent reasoned that since the defendant did comply with the covenant during his six years of employment with Lenel, it cannot be said that he did not provide any consideration for the option, thereby reducing the argument in  favor of rescission.

As a lower appellate court decision, the Lenel case is more likely to lead an academic interest than to have an binding impact on the law on this issue.  However, the case illustrates that while rescission may be available as a remedy for employers, it is a difficult path to travel and that addressing termination rights in the option agreements may be advisable.


Who’s Up for Tax-Free Capital Gains?

Posted on May 11th, 2013

From the editor:  We saw many companies raising capital in 2010 and 2011 to take advantage of the tax relief under Section 1202 of the Internal Revenue Code to give investors the potential for tax-free gains if they held the stock for the required 5 years and the company met certain conditions.  While that relief went away in 2012, recent tax law enactments have brought back this tax treatment for 2012 and 2013. We would like to thank our tax colleague Travis Blais from Travis Blais & Co.  for preparing the following post on this topic:

Most of us know that the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, better known as the “fiscal cliff bill,” extended lower across-the-board tax rates, including those for dividends and long-term capital gain, for all but a handful of taxpayers.  Less well known is that the ATRA extended many business tax benefits, including the possibility of tax-free capital gains for “qualified small business stock” (QSBS).

Tax-free?  Yes.  QSBS is potentially the ultimate tax bargain – QSBS acquired through the end of 2013 and held for 5 years will incur 0% capital gains tax upon eventual sale. Of note, QSBS was extended retroactively, meaning stock previously acquired in 2012 as well that acquired in 2013 may qualify.

As you would expect, this kind of benefit comes with a lot of conditions.  The stock must be of a domestic C corporation, purchased at original issue for money, property other than stock, or services.  As a shareholder, a C corporation itself is not eligible for the tax-free treatment.  The tax-free gain is limited to the greater of “10x” (10 times one’s investment) or $10 million.  To be a “qualified small business,” the issuing corporation must never have had assets greater than $50 million either before or immediately after the stock purchase.  Moreover, 80% of the corporation’s assets must be used in a qualified trade or business, which excludes professional services, finance, farming, mining, or hospitality.For many investors, the most daunting requirement is that stock must be held for at least five years to qualify for the 0% rate.  In this regard, it is helpful that QSBS can be “rolled over,” that is, sold and its proceeds used to purchase different QSBS, deferring capital gains recognition and “tacking” the holding periods in hopes of crossing the five-year finish line.The obvious opportunity to acquire QSBS is upon the startup of a new business or a venture capital investment in an existing, small corporation.  But be on the lookout for less evident QSBS situations.  For instance, LLCs could be converted to corporations, particularly in anticipation of an investor financing that might require such a conversion anyway.  Investors might be holding stock rights in the form of options or convertible debt that could be exercised into stock.  Or QSBS may be available in newly formed shell corporations created to pursue a reverse acquisition.

Travis Blais


Adjunct Law Professor Blog

Posted on May 10th, 2013

After years of teaching corporate mergers and acquisitions at New England Law School, our founder and managing partner, Dimitry Herman, has become a contributing author to the well-known website called lawprofessorblog.com, under the Adjunct Law Prof Blog.  This blog in general is very interesting source of academic thinking on a variety of legal topics and it is a privilege to be able to be associated with it.  A few of his recent posts can be found here.


Recent Massachusetts Appeals Court Decision Interprets Enforceability of Online Terms and Conditions

Posted on May 9th, 2013

A recent Massachusetts appeals court decision by holds that a forum selection and limitation of liability clause is not enforceable under Massachusetts law in a browsewrap agreement.  This decision is a useful read both for lawyers drafting these documents and product developers and UI folks that create the user experience during which these legal terms are viewed and accepted.

The case involves the interpretation of Yahoo!’s Terms of Service (TOS) relating to its free email service.  The case was brought by the administrators of the estate of a Yahoo email user to get court approval for access to the account and the content of the emails.  Because the Yahoo! TOS had a forum selection clause requiring that all disputes be brought in California, the Court had the opportunity to interpret the enforceability under Massachusetts law of such clauses in online agreements.

After noting that the Court has not previously considered the enforceability of forum selection and limitation of liability clauses in online agreements, it looked to the case law on such issues in traditional paper contracts.  In those cases, courts have enforced such provisions as long as they have been reasonably communicated and accepted and if, considering all the circumstances, it is reasonable to enforce the provision at issue.  The burden on the first prong fall on the issuer of the TOS.  On the second prong (that the TOS themselves were reasonable), in the forum selection case, the burden falls on the plaintiffs, and no such burden applies in case of a limitations provision.

Applying this standard to online agreements, the Court held that Yahoo! did not meet their burden of showing the TOS were reasonably communicated and accepted.  Yahoo!’s affidavit that users were “given an opportunity to review” the TOS and Privacy Policy prior to registering” was not sufficient by itself.  The Court could not infer from that affidavit that the TOS were actually displayed on the user’s screen.  If the user was asked to follow a link to the TOS — which is a pretty typical user experience — Yahoo!’s affidavit would have to have provided the specific instructions relating to the link, how prominently displayed was the link, and any other information bearing on the reasonableness of this communication.

The Court also held that Yahoo! failed in showing that the TOS were accepted.  Past cases have enforced such provisions only in click-wrap agreements (where “terms of the agreement were displayed, at least in part, on the user’s computer screen and the user was required to signify his or her assent by clicking ‘I accept.’”), but not in browsewrap agreements (where ”website terms and conditions of use are posted on the website typically as a hyperlink at the bottom of the screen.”).

On that basis, the Court refused to extend the enforceability to browsewrap agreements and held that the record did not show “the terms of any agreement were reasonably communicated or that they were accepted.”

This case is reminder that legal attention to one’s online form agreements is a necessary part of operating a web-based business.  Especially if the offering is free (or fremium), website owners should take appropriate caution, and may want to sacrifice a little user experience and customer conversion in favor of knowing that to ensure that those online terms and conditions are actually going to be enforceable when the time comes.


Recent MA SJC Noteworthy Decision, so to speak

Posted on Apr 19th, 2013

A recent decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is noteworthy for transactional practitioners:

In T. Butera Auburn vs. Williams, the Court held that a purchaser of a veterinary business was not entitled to withhold payment on a promissory note issued in connection with the purchase of defendant’s business.  The case involved the purchase of a veterinary clinic business from the defendant via an asset purchase agreement, where $800,000 was paid at the closing, the another $400,000 was payable via a promissory note over 15 years.  According to the decision, when plaintiffs discovered that the defendant was in violation of her covenant not to compete and other post-closing obligations, they brought suit and sought to hold back payment on the note to set off their damages.  Plaintiffs argued that they were excused from performance under the Note based on language on the APA that a default under a related transaction document (such as the Note) would be a default under the APA.  The Court rejected this argument, noting that this case involved the opposite scenario.  Here the breach occurred under the APA provisions, not the Note, and the Note did not contain a cross-default provision that would have potentially allowed the Plaintiffs to stop payment.  The Court did comment however, that if the plaintiffs could have shown that “the damaged business itself was supposed to generate the income from which the debt … was to be repaid, [the defendant] might well be estopped from obtaining judicially compelled acceleration on the basis that the Note was breached when payments were not subsequently made on time by the borrower.”

This case is a useful reminder that:

  • cross-default provisions and rights for setoff in the event of an indemnification or other claim should be included in Notes and other transactional documents
  • Language such as that quoted below may be helpful to add as an acknowledgment to a remedies section in the transaction documents to prevent a similar result